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Abstract
In this thesis, I present a novel theory of musical meaning. This theory posits a
complementary relationship between the theories described in Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s
Generative Theory of Tonal Music and Arnie Cox’s Music and Embodied Cognition. Each of
these theories explain particular aspects of musical meaning (semantic and grammatical,
respectively), though I argue that by unifying these theories into a broader framework, they can
explain more about musical meaning than they could individually. This unification is performed
via the novel theory I present: the Analogical Argument. This argument suggests that Lerdahl
and Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Tonal Music is theoretically analogous to Noam
Chomsky’s theory of Generative Linguistic Grammar (Chomsky, 1966). Given the success of
Chomsky’s theory, as well the cognitive approach he employs more generally, in explaining how
we construe linguistic meaning, we should expect similar if not analogous processes to be
responsible for the construal of musical meaning. Thus, the Generative Theory of Tonal Music is
sufficient for explaining how the musical meanings explained by Arnie Cox’s mimetic hypothesis
are cognized so as to give rise to the emergent musical meaning that is characteristic of musical
experiences.
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We will have achieved much for scientific study of aesthetics when we come, not merely
to a logical understanding, but also to the certain and immediate apprehension of the fact
that the further development of art is bound up with the duality of the Apollonian and the
Dionysian, … their continuing strife and only periodically occurring reconciliation.
—Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, 1872
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Section 1: Introduction
Music is practiced in all known cultures and throughout history. Underlying this
sociological truth is a philosophical puzzle: why, at an individual level, do we find music so
enjoyable and, above all, meaningful? We can be moved to tears or feel intense elation, or feel as
if we’ve experienced pure bliss or the transcendence of the self, upon hearing certain
compositions. Music has the ability to act as a doorway to alternative states of consciousness,
and it can sometimes seem as if it allows us to feel others’ feelings. Mysteriously, music has the
capacity to be expressive without the use of images, words, and other representations; it is
unique among the arts in this regard. This lack of representational content then figures in our
phenomenology: we hear music as being expressive of feelings, but face great difficulty in
identifying the people and states of affairs that we generally take to be metaphysically prior to
feelings, in the music. Though the feelings we have in musical experience are felt to be as real,
animated, vivid and meaningful (if not more) as any of the other feelings we have nonetheless.
The feelings that can be invoked by music not only seem to vary infinitely, but also have the
potential to arise with an overwhelming intensity. It is far from clear how mere sounds have this
potential.
While a comprehensive answer to these questions is well beyond our current grasp,
developments in science and philosophy have offered insights that grant us the ability to make
progress in understanding music. Specifically, Arnie Cox’s mimetic hypothesis (as presented in
Music and Embodied Cognition) and Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s Generative Musical Grammar
each provide explanations of two essential components of musical cognition: semantic and
grammatical components respectively. In what follows, I explain the meaning we hear in music
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by unifying these theories into a broader theoretical framework that explains more about musical
meaning than each theory could individually.
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Section 2: Background
Before tackling the question of musical meaning, it will be necessary to get clear on what
we mean by ‘music’.
The term ‘music’ is often ambiguous between the sounds that constitute music, and the
affective states we have when hearing these sounds, or both. To avoid such ambiguities in the
current project, I’ll regard musical stimuli as sets of pitch-time events characterized by
temporal/rhythmic and tonal/harmonic elements; I’ll regard musical experience, on the other
hand, as what we experience when hearing musical stimuli.
Musical stimuli, or sets of pitch-time events characterized by temporal/rhythmic and
tonal/harmonic elements, can be defined in physical terms as sound wave propagations. The two
defining features of pitch-time events are of course pitch and time, though both features are
already inherent in our definition of sound wave propagations. All sound waves propagate at
particular frequencies, and this frequency just is pitch; they are also all situated in time. Thus, the
term ‘pitch-time events’ highlights those aspects of sound wave propagations that are most
relevant to music, namely pitch and time.
Rhythmic and melodic/harmonic elements of pitch-time events can be realized when we
have multiple pitch-time events. Rhythm refers to patterns and regularities in the temporal
distribution of pitch-time events. For example, this rhythmic formalization indicates that all four
pitch-time events are of the same length, and are therefore each temporally equidistant from their
adjacent pitch-time events:
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Figure 1

Melody refers to patterns and regularities in sequences of pitch-time events with respect
to pitch. Melody is exemplified by the following:

Figure 2

Harmony roughly refers to the extent to which different and simultaneous pitch-time
events can ‘clash’ or ‘agree’ with each other; we can further ground this in physical terms by
reducing this ‘clashing’ (dissonance) or ‘agreement’ (consonance) to the extent to which the
differing frequencies of different pitches align or interfere with each other:

Figure 3
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We can now return to the other concept associated with ‘music’, namely musical
experience, or what we experience when hearing musical stimuli. When we listen to musical
stimuli, we standardly experience a series of vivid and salient affective states, though sometimes
we don’t. The extent to which such affective states are invoked in musical experience is
seemingly dependent on factors such as how much attention we pay to the music. We will
reserve the term ‘musical experience’ to simply refer to what we experience when we hear
musical stimuli, regardless of the salience of the affective states they invoke.
Musical meaning, on the other hand, will refer more specifically to those affective states
that are not only invoked in musical experience, but also particularly vivid and salient. Musical
meaning refers to the sense we may have in musical experience that what we hear is moving,
exciting, sad, angry, meaningful.
Notice that all of the properties of musical stimuli thus described are objective and
physically defined. The pitch of pitch-time events can be reduced to the wavelength, or distance
between the peaks of a sound wave. The temporal component of pitch-time events can be
reduced to the time between when the physical source of a sound first resonates so as to produce
sound waves, and when it ceases.
Where musical stimuli are objective, musical meaning is subjective. That is, physical
features of sounds are publicly observable, while musical meaning is not, as it is experienced
subjectively, and our subjective experiences are not publicly available. While we could in
principle ‘observe’ or hear the same musical stimuli as others, we can’t ‘observe’ their mental
states or definitively know their character, and it is in this sense that they are not publicly
available; it is in this sense that they are subjective.
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Though this is not to say that objective, publicly available facts of the world are totally
irrelevant to the character of musical meaning. Musical meaning is mentally constructed in such
a way that objective features of musical stimuli guide our imaginations, not quite unlike
experiences of color: While we subjectively experience color, we know that its qualitative
character is not objectively confirmable in the same way objective qualities like pitch or
temporal duration are. That said, we can also recognize how the appearance of certain colors in
our perceptions is systematic: the colors we perceive are determined by physical properties of
what we are perceiving (the frequency of the light waves it reflects), and how the visual stimuli
these objective properties give way to (reflected light waves) are processed by our perceptual
cognitive systems, which consist of rule-governed computational constraints on how we process
visual stimuli.
Thus, we have an explanation for the systematicity of color perception: objective physical
features of things in the world determine the stimuli we receive when observing them, and
rule-governed computational constraints determine how we arrive at the color (a qualitative
thing) we ultimately perceive.
Though in music, we have yet to find a satisfactory explanation for how we go from the
objective things (pitch-time events) to the subjective, qualitative things (musical meaning). We
want a story to explain this. Relatedly, we should want to explain why certain kinds of chords,
compositions, genres, etc. (which are all essentially particular kinds of patterns and regularities
in relations among pitch-time events) reliably invoke the same feelings in us. We can refer to this
seeming determination of musical meanings by processes that mediate their construal as
‘systematicity’. As discussed, the systematicity of color was explained by accounting for our
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perceptual cognitive systems. Might we expect to find something playing an analogous role for
musical meaning?
In what follows, I present a novel theory of musical meaning. The cornerstone of this
theory is what I call the ‘Analogical Argument’. The core insight of the Analogical Argument is
straightforward: Musical meaning is analogous to linguistic meaning, just as standard theories of
linguistics following Chomsky regard linguistic meaning as stemming from (1) basic meaningful
elements and (2) how these basic elements are related. So too, I argue, can we regard musical
meaning as stemming from (1) basic meaningful elements and (2) how those basic elements are
related. This prompts two distinct questions:

Q1: How do pitch-time events invoke affective states at all?
Q2: In virtue of what do sequences of pitch-time events systematically invoke the
affective states (musical meaning) that they do?

Borrowing from Arnie Cox’s mimetic hypothesis (Cox, 2016) and Lerdahl and
Jackendoff’s Generative Theory of Linguistics (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983), I argue for
answers to these questions. First, in response to Q1, I present the mimetic hypothesis in Section 3
which says that particular pitch-time events invoke affective states in virtue of the fact that they
resemble sounds we associate with motor actions, which we in turn associate with affective
states. Call this mimetic hypothesis ‘EMC’ (short for embodied musical cognition). By
explaining how pitch-time events can invoke affective states, EMC answers Q1; it explains how
there can be musical meaning at all. Following this exposition, I will consider possible
weaknesses of EMC and evaluate its contributions to the current project in Section 4. Next, in
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Section 5, I present Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s theory of Generative Musical Grammar (GMG).
Finally, I argue that Q2 can be answered by the Analogical Argument, the theory that will be
presented in Section 6. In Section 7, I elaborate on the implications the Analogical Argument has
for considerations of variations in musical meaning among listeners.
This theory posits an interaction between GMG and EMC to explain musical stimuli’s
systematic invocation of affective states. Further, the Analogical Argument is ‘analogical’ due to
its claim that there is an analogical relationship between GMG, and the processes described in
Noam Chomsky’s Theory of Generative Linguistic Grammar. This analogy lies in GMG’s
mediating our relation of pitch-time events so as to give rise to what I will call emergent musical
meaning in essentially the same way that the cognitive processes posited in the Theory of
Generative Linguistic Grammar mediate our relation of terms so as to give rise to emergent
linguistic meaning. We should think GMG can fulfill an analogous role to the processes posited
in the Theory of Generative Linguistic Grammar because they both posit a grammar—a set of
constraints on how we relate constitutive elements of complex linguistic expressions (GLG) or
complex combinations of pitch-time events (GMG). Thus, in explaining how we relate
pitch-time events, GMG provides a story of how the musical meanings secured by EMC could be
related to each other so as to give rise to emergent musical meaning.
We are now ready to begin our investigation. Though before proceeding, I’d like to make
a few preliminary remarks. Firstly, given the central role that affective states will play in the
Analogical Argument, I will provide an account of what affective states are, how they interact
with other mental states, and answer other relevant questions. Secondly, I’d like to elaborate on
why our motivating questions warrant attention, explain how the Analogical Argument is fit to
answer these questions, and discuss how the contributions of this project could be situated within
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the broader music philosophical literature. I begin by providing a metaphysical account of
affective states.
Affective states are phenomenal, non-intentional mental states. Here, ‘phenomenal’
indicates that affective states have a phenomenal character; there is a feeling of what it’s like to
have particular affective states. This feeling can vary with respect to different phenomenological
dimensions. For example, we can experience the affect associated with getting stung by a bee
and notice that it is not pleasurable (one phenomenological dimension), while also prominent in
our awareness in its onset (another phenomenological dimension) and diminishing in intensity
over time (another). The ‘non-intentional’ component of affective states indicates that affective
states do not have representational content; they are not about anything in particular. Contrast
this with states of belief, which are intentional; they are about particular things. For example, I
may believe that tigers have black stripes; this belief is about tigers. Though there is no such
‘about-ness’ to be found for affective states. 1 Given that there is no representational content to
affective states, affective states consist exclusively in their phenomenal character.
Further, given that affective states are defined by their phenomenal character, they are
conscious states by definition. This is because we can only come to know the character of an
affective state through experiencing them, and experience entails conscious awareness. Though
to be sure, we can attend to affective states to varying extents. In some cases, we may attend to
affective states so minimally that they may be left out of a verbal report of what one is feeling at
a given moment, or avoid one’s own awareness. Though this should be distinguished from the
1

One might call this claim into question: the pain of the bee’s sting is about the bee, or the sting itself. This seems
intuitively plausible, but we should distinguish between the feeling of what it’s like to get stung by a bee, and
possibly simultaneous mental states such as the perceptual belief that one has been stung by a bee. We may have
mental states such as the perceptual belief just described that do have an ‘about-ness’, but these are distinct from the
affective state itself which does not have an ‘about-ness’. To be intentional in the relevant sense is to represent some
thing or state of affairs in the world. In the affective state associated with getting stung by a bee itself (as well as
other affective states), we don’t find such representations; affective states could not include representations in
principle because they lack the conceptual content that would be required for this.
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affective states not being conscious. In order for affective states which we attend to minimally to
be included in a verbal report of what one is feeling, or to reach the purview of one’s awareness,
one would only need to direct their attention towards (attend to) it; it would be a matter of
noticing ‘what is already there’, as it were.
Affective states are of course one kind of mental state we can have, among many. For
most (if not all) non-affective mental states, there are accounts we can give of the causal
relationships mental states have to other mental states, sensory registrations, and behavioral
dispositions. A behavioral disposition is a proclivity towards performing certain behaviors if one
is presented with particular sensory stimuli. To give one example of such an account of a causal
relationship among mental states, I may have a belief that tigers are dangerous animals. If I also
have a desire to avoid dangerous animals, then these states can causally give way to a belief that
I should avoid tigers, as well as a behavioral disposition to run if I see a tiger.
I contend that affective states do not have what might be called ‘bi-directional’ causal
relationships with other mental states. That is, affective states can be caused by sensory
registrations (e.g. getting stung by a bee), and they can be caused by other mental states (e.g. the
invocation of positive affective states as the result of recalling a pleasant memory), but exert no
causal influence of their own.
Though this is not to overlook the remarkable extent to which affective states coincide
systematically with mental states that do have causal influence on other mental states. This
coincidence can be so reliable that it may appear as if an affective state causes another mental
state, though a proper analysis of the mental processes at play in such situations reveals this not
to be the case. For example, I may feel the affect associated with a feeling of hunger, and it may
seem as if this affect is what causes a desire to visit my fridge. But rather, it is a state of needing
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food that is responsible for the transition to a state of desire (to visit my fridge). The affective
state simply coincides with this transition. I propose that changes in behavioral dispositions only
come about through transitions among non-affective mental states. Thus, if affective states have
no causal influence over other mental states, then by extension, they can not themselves invoke
behavioral dispositions.
Though, as I’ll explain in Section 3, musical affect is uniquely associated with certain
behavioral dispositions by way of EMC, which claims that affective states are invoked by
musical stimuli in virtue of associations we have between sounds, affective states, and motor
actions. Again, musical affective states, like affective states more generally, can’t themselves
invoke behavioral dispositions. Though they need not cause behavioral dispositions in order to
be associated with them. Not unlike how affective states can coincide systematically with mental
states, affective states can coincide systematically with certain behavioral dispositions in musical
experience, and it is in this sense that they are associated.
There are two possible concerns with the account of affect I’ve presented here that are
worth addressing. The first concern is about the potential that appealing exclusively to affective
states has for explaining all of the feelings we have in musical experience. It may seem as if
there is an obvious difference between the affect associated with getting stung by a bee, and what
Peter Kivy has called ‘garden variety’ emotions such as ecstasy, resentment, triumph, jealousy,
etc. which seem relatively complex. I contend that such complex feelings are the result of
complex relations among basic feelings (Nussbaum, 2007). There are some affective states that
are rooted in our senses and can be experienced universally (see Section 7), and are in this sense
basic. In the theory of musical meaning I will present, I argue that the invocation of such basic
affective states in musical experience can be explained by EMC. Further, GMG can explain how
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we generate structural descriptions of music. This basically means that GMG explains how we
relate musical stimuli, and the basic affective states that come with them, together such that they
give way to complex affective states.
Another possible concern about the account of affect I’ve presented is that it contradicts
the widely held intuition that affective states in fact have causal influence over other mental
states. More specifically, this account contradicts the intuition that affective states are what
motivate our desire to have musical experiences; it seems intuitively and obviously correct to say
that one listens to their favorite song repeatedly because they enjoy this musical experience.
Though not unlike experiences of hunger, I argue that the affective states we encounter in
musical experience simply coincide with mental states that have causal influence over other
mental states. Presumably, this account will seem especially unsatisfying when applied to music
because there doesn’t seem to be anything we get from musical experiences aside from the
experience (and the affective states that come with it) itself. Contrast this with cases such as
those where one experiences hunger; while it also seems counterintuitive that the affect of
hunger does not cause any transition among mental states, we can still make sense of a causal
story about why I ultimately visit my fridge. It is not the mere feeling of hunger that motivates
my visiting my fridge, but rather the state of needing food. Satisfying my need for food has
obvious practical benefits, and this seems to render a causal story of why I visit my fridge
rational.
There is much room for speculation about what an analogous practical benefit might be in
a musical context. Some possible answers include music’s ability to strengthen social
relationships and secure common meaning (Dissanayake, 2000), or how music involves the
practice and strengthening of our own capacities for motor simulation (Nussbaum, 2007). There
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are principled reasons to believe that musical experiences could have a practical benefit(s) that
renders their pursuit rational, and indeed, such hypotheses have already found some empirical
support. This said, these practical benefits would serve to demonstrate how this account of affect
is no more problematic when applied to music than when it is applied to standard examples of
affective states such as hunger.
Finally, it’s worth mentioning here that I will be limiting my investigation to what is
sometimes referred to as ‘pure music’ in the music philosophical literature. Pure music is music
that is not about anything, or has no representational content. This is in contrast to ‘program
music’, which does have representational content; this can be the result of a musical piece
including lyrics, having a suggestive title, being written to accompany a play, etc. As has been
explained, musical meaning is essentially affective, and affective states are essentially
non-intentional. Thus, in the interest of isolating and explaining musical meaning, we will
exclude music with representational content, or ‘program music’, and its possibly confounding
influence from our investigation.
With this groundwork set, let us now consider why our motivating questions warrant
attention, how the Analogical Argument is fit to answer these questions, and how the
contributions of this project could be situated within the broader music philosophy literature.
To further clarify the weight of the puzzle at hand, let us remember that musical
experience refers to any instance where we hear musical stimuli and construe musical meaning
(which consists in vivid and salient musically invoked affective states), but also those where we
don’t construe musical meaning. It goes without saying that there are myriad possible musical
experiences, though those experiences that give way to musical meaning are most
philosophically interesting because the mental states associated with them resist simple
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explanation. To take one example of a musical experience that does not give way to musical
meaning, we can imagine a situation where music is playing quietly, but one is too engrossed in a
good conversation to engage with the music. The effect that music would have on its listener in
this case is not mysterious: there might be a mere sensory registration and/or basic cognition of
the pitch-time events that would not involve the invocation of vivid and salient affective states2.
We can explain how such states are realized in totally causal terms, and can in fact even build
computers that realize them.
In contrast, what is mysterious is how we get from physical stimuli to vivid and salient
feelings. There exist no such causal stories to explain how these states emerge from, or
systematically relate to, musical stimuli. Thus, we should focus our investigation on mental
states/situations that display this mysterious invocation as much as possible. This is why
explaining musical meaning will be the overarching goal of this project.
Such questions are by no means new. Musical expression has long been the object of
philosophical inquiry, and I consider the current project to be an extension of the literature on
musical expression3. I hope to make novel contributions to this area of investigation by offering a
theory of musical expression that can explain and unify two ‘worlds’ or ‘components’ of musical
experience within a single theoretical framework.
So far as I can tell, the vast majority, if not all, of the theories of musical meaning that
have been presented hitherto primarily contribute explanations of only one of the two
components of musical experience I have alluded to (the grammatical and the affective/semantic
components of musical experience) or fall short of sufficiently explaining how they must
2

This is not to say that this musical experience couldn’t involve any affective invocation at all. Though it is to say
that this musical experience would not give way to musical meaning unless the affect that is invoked is vivid and
salient, which is not the case.
3
Though I adopt a slightly different terminology than is traditional in this literature; what philosophers have
by-and-large referred to as ‘musical expression’, I refer to as ‘musical meaning’ with the intention of foregrounding
the role that grammatical processes play in the construal of musical meaning.
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interact. In the philosophical domain, many of the theories that have been presented deal only in
the affective/semantic component. To consider two prominent examples, persona theories
(theories arguing that music is expressive/meaningful in virtue of our imagining a persona whose
emotions are being expressed through the music) and resemblance theories (theories arguing that
music is expressive/meaningful in virtue of resemblances it shares with human expressiveness)
tell a plausible story about why music is meaningful. Though they say little of what the
systematicity of musical meaning inheres in. Worse, these theories often rely liberally on the role
of the imagination in listening such that all of the questions we had about musical meaning could
equally apply to imagination itself. If one argues that music is meaningful in virtue of our
imagining a persona to whom heard emotional expressions are attributed, we still need an
account of why we imagine what we ultimately imagine. These imaginative constraints are often
largely omitted from such theories.
Separately, we also find what could be called a Hard Problem of Musical Meaning, to
borrow from David Chalmers’ terminology (Chalmers, 1995). We sometimes see explanations of
musical meaning rooted in non-philosophical disciplines (e.g. neuroscience and cognitive
science) as well as in philosophy (e.g. Formalist school of thought) that purport to explain
musical meaning while appealing exclusively to essentially non-meaningful
phenomena/elements. To put it crassly, many of these theories are some variation of: we notice
that x pattern of neural activity/cognitive processes/formal description are co-occurrent with
experiences of musical meaning, therefore, x must be responsible for musical meaning. Though
patterns of neural activity, cognitive processes, or formal descriptions, in principle, could not
explain musical meaning on their own for the same reason Chalmers contends consciousness
could not be explained by appeal to patterns of neural activity and cognitive processes. Namely,
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such cognitive/neuronal patterns say nothing about why hearing musical stimuli involves
experience. We can know everything there is to know about the neuronal/cognitive processes or
formal descriptions associated with music without ever explaining why there is a feeling of what
it’s like to hear a piece of music.
GMG is one such theory in the cognitive domain. Though to the credit of Lerdahl and
Jackendoff, they do not make claims about the implications the cognitive processes they posit
have on affect. This makes their theory that much more amenable to unification with another that
does make claims about musical affect, namely EMC. My hope is that in unifying EMC and
GMG, we can arrive at an understanding of how the two components of musical experience
interact, giving this theory of musical meaning a wider explanatory scope than those that have
preceded it. Though it should be emphasized that the Analogical Argument is a continuation of
previous investigations of musical meaning. While the past theories of musical meaning I’ve
mentioned here fall short of adequately explaining musical meaning, they provide valuable
insights into what this explanation must be like, and I rely heavily on these insights in order to
develop the Analogical Argument.
I now begin by explaining EMC.
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Section 3: Elementary Musical Meaning
In Music and Embodied Cognition: Listening, Moving, Feeling, and Thinking, Arnie Cox
presents the mimetic hypothesis or EMC, a theory of how musical meaning is, in part, a product
of mimetic cognition. ‘Mimetic’ refers broadly to imitation; mimetic cognition refers to the
cognitive processes that mediate imitation. EMC provides an answer to our first question of why
we experience affect when hearing musical sounds on the basis of two theses: (1) we mimetically
engage with different kinds of musical sounds (e.g. vocals, instruments), and (2) mimetic
engagement entails the experience of affect. Together, these theses entail (3) we experience affect
when hearing musical sounds. ‘Mimetic engagement’ simply entails the activation of mimetic
cognition in response to some stimuli. In this way, EMC provides a theory of how music could
invoke affective states at all (addressing Q1).
I proceed by explaining each of EMC’s two core theses, beginning with (1). Explaining
this claim requires an explanation of how we could mimetically engage with sounds at all (let
alone as reliably as EMC hypothesizes we mimetically engage with music). Explaining how we
mimetically engage with sounds then requires explaining some fundamental forms and
sub-processes of mimetics in general, (outside of musical or otherwise audial contexts), and as
they pertain to EMC. I begin by establishing this conceptual foundation.
There are a variety of ways one might imitate something else. In humans, mimesis is
perhaps most apparent in the interactions of infants and caregivers. These interactions are often
characterized by the caregiver’s repetition of gestures or facial expressions in hopes that the
infant will imitate them. According to EMC, the infant’s eventual imitation of these motor
actions grants them a better understanding of “What’s it like to do that?” and “What’s it like to be
that?” (Cox, 12). Through imitating these actions, the infant associates the performance of the
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action with the affective states it invokes in them and uses this as a basis for recognizing the
affective states of others (Cox, 16). If the infant comes to associate pleasure with the action of
smiling based on the co-occurrence of the two, they can recognize that their caregiver is
experiencing pleasure when they recognize their smile—this ability to recognize the affective
states of others on the basis of our observing them perform motor actions for which we have
developed affective associations, as well as the notion that we typically do this, are basic
assumptions of EMC. As the infant comes to draw stronger associations between motor actions
and affective states, they begin to share the meaning of these actions with their caregivers and
can perform the actions themselves with communicative intention.
This kind of overt imitation does not explain how we could mimetically engage with
sounds, and is demonstrably not present in all musical experiences. We need a broader definition
of imitation that accounts for covert imitation of sounds. Thus, Cox goes on to make a distinction
between two forms of mimesis: Mimetic Motor Action (MMA) and Mimetic Motor Imagery
(MMI)4. MMA refers to imitation through overt bodily movement, as exhibited in
infant-caregiver interactions. Conversely, MMI is a form of covert mimesis where imitation
occurs mentally as opposed to occurring through overt bodily movement. The ‘motor imagery’ in
Mimetic Motor Imagery refers to the imagination of one’s own actions/muscle movements. For
example, one might imagine themself performing a dance move they’ve only just seen for the
first time as an act of preparation for possibly performing the move themself. Cox argues that as
we get older, we increasingly rely on MMI over MMA (Cox, 16). This would make practical
sense in light of the fact that MMI is highly convenient—rather than overtly imitating every

4

The existence of MMI is empirically supported by the experiments of Calvo-Merino et al. (2005) and Iacaboni et
al. (2005), among several others, which demonstrate activation of brain areas associated with motor actions (call
these motor areas) in the absence of overt motor movement after visual perception of others dancing or grasping a
mug, respectively.
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action we observe, we can covertly imagine ourselves performing these actions and achieve
similar benefits (imagining ourselves performing a dance move gives us some useful indication
of whether we could pull it off). Our imaginative capabilities increase with practice, and we can
eventually mentally model more exceptional actions with greater accuracy, which then eases our
reliance on MMA.
This foundation allows us to begin drawing connections between mimetics and sound
(which will eventually allow us to draw connections to music). The first point to acknowledge is
that all sounds are caused by physical events and are themselves evidence of the physical events
that caused them. That is, sounds are non-arbitrarily related to their physical causes such that
they provide clues about certain aspects of their physical causes. For example, a loud, booming
sound is more indicative of a large or heavy physical cause than a small or light one. Certain
aspects of sounds (loud) are non-arbitrarily related to certain aspects of their physical causes
(heavy). This fact is presumably uncontroversial, but it gives way to the idea that we make
inferences about the physical sources of sounds based on sounds themselves (which is again a
basic assumption of EMC).
In making such inferences about the physical causes of sounds, we imagine what they
must be like, and are consequently engaged in MMI. To clarify, ‘inference’ as it is used here
refers to the kinds of inferences that are automatic and often unconscious. That is, we do not
perform these inferences deliberately, and the results of these inferences, not the processes of
inferences themselves, are overlaid on our experience. For example, we may hear (but not see)
someone performing a tap-dancing routine (assume we have a concept of tap-dancing and some
relevant experience with the actions/sounds associated with this act). The frequency, intensity,
etc. of the sounds of the dancer’s foot-taps serve as indications of the motor actions (at least
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certain aspects of them) that caused them. We might infer from the sounds of two nearly
simultaneous and heavy foot-taps that the dancer has jumped. In making such inferences, we
imagine the movements of the dancer, and are consequently engaged in MMI. Again, this
process of inference occurs unconsciously and automatically such that we find the MMI (the
image of the dancer jumping), but not the inference that led to it, in experience. Thus, we can
mimetically engage with sounds caused by motor actions/physical events5.
Although we mimetically engage with sounds, it seems clear to me that we generally
mimetically engage with music much more extensively than with other non-musical sounds on
the basis that musical experiences are so much more affectively rich than experiences of
non-musical sounds. Cox accounts for this differential mimetic engagement by arguing that the
inference of goal-directed physical causes is more likely to lead to mimetic engagement, and that
we detect goal-directedness in music.
We can first consider the relationship between goal-directedness and mimetic
engagement. The inferences we make about the physical causes of sounds may vary in the extent
to which they indicate a goal-directed source. For example, we may hear (and not see) thudding
against the steps of a stairway, the turning of a doorknob, and the creaking of an opening door. In
such situations, we would likely infer that there is a person who has walked up some stairs and
opened a door—a series of goal-directed actions. The notion that goal-directedness plays an
important role in what we mimetically engage with is empirically supported by behavioral
research on imitation indicating that we tend to focus more on the goal of an action rather than
the action itself (Wohlschläger, Gattis, and Bekkering, 2003); other research similarly indicates

5

This assertion is empirically supported by fMRI experiments demonstrating activation of motor areas when
performing hand actions and when only hearing (and not seeing) others perform hand actions (Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh,
and Keysers, 2006). The hand actions used in the experiment were simple tasks such as ripping a piece of paper.
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that MMI is more likely to be activated in observation, or inference, of more goal-directed
actions (Grèzes et al., 1998), as determined by how much neuronal activation is observed in
areas of the brain taken to be responsible for motor action/imagery.
Conversely, when we hear the sound of thunder, we typically don’t think some
goal-directed agent has caused it6, as the sound of thunder reliably has merely physical (that is,
non-goal-directed) causes. On the other hand, the goal-directedness of the causes of some sounds
may be ambiguous. If you live in an apartment and hear a thump overhead, there would not be
enough evidence to confidently infer what caused the sound (or the extent of its
goal-directedness); perhaps your neighbor stomped their foot in frustration or a book happened
to fall from their bookshelf. Such sounds are not as obviously indicative of the goal-directedness
of their physical causes because we associate them with physical causes that are both
goal-directed and not.
There is thus a continuum of mimetic engagement/inferred goal-directedness: on one end
of this continuum are sounds such as those of walking up a flight of stairs or opening a door, the
physical sources of which, according to EMC, we reliably model through MMA or MMI (per the
behavioral research above) because we identify them as goal-directed actions. At the other end of
this spectrum are sounds for which we would likely not infer a goal-directed physical cause.

6

Granted, we can imagine cases where, for example, someone literally believes in the Zeus of Greek Mythology and
infers the sound of thunder to have a goal-directed cause on this basis. However, these are generally outlier cases
where our inferences are influenced by high-level psychological states (in this case, belief). For present purposes, we
need not concern ourselves with such cases in order to explain how EMC explains the invocation of musical affect,
as only considering cases that don’t involve high-level psychological states are sufficient for telling the story EMC
seeks to tell. Further, while it is interesting to consider what the limits of this influence are, as well as how other
high-level psychological states such as attitudes or desires might exert an influence on inferred goal-directedness, we
lack a theory of the manner and extent to which different high-level psychological states exert influence on musical
meaning. These high-level psychological states include belief, such as a literal belief in Zeus, which may be the
primary cause for the kind of inference thus described. The influence of high-level psychological states on musical
meaning is discussed as an area for future research in Section 8.
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Given that goal-directedness, to some extent, determines the extent to which we mimetically
engage, we would not reliably mimetically engage with these sounds.
The sounds of music largely belong to the former end of the continuum. Music is unique
in that we generally mimetically engage with music considerably more reliably than with
non-musical audial stimuli. According to EMC, this is because we detect goal-directedness in
music. We understand musical sounds to be reliably caused by goal-directed actions because we
have all observed acts, however subtle, of musical performance, such as humming a tune.
Inferring a goal-directed cause leads more reliably to mimetic engagement. We infer
goal-directed causes for music to a greater extent/frequency than for non-musical sounds, and
consequently mimetically engage with them to a greater extent/frequency than for non-musical
sounds.
Thus far, we have become familiar with mimesis, explained how we mimetically engage
with sound, and explained why we mimetically engage with music to a unique extent. At this
point, we have essentially explained EMC’s assertion that ‘we mimetically engage when we hear
different kinds of musical sounds’. However, one potential objection to EMC as it has been
presented thus far is that if our capacity for mimetic engagement through MMI is grounded in
our past motor experiences, then we should have great difficulty mimetically engaging with
sounds produced with instruments/techniques that we ourselves have never performed with.
Further, how can we mimetically engage with digital musical sounds, which have no obvious
physical cause? Given that affect is reliably invoked by such sounds while their mimetic basis is
not obvious, this would seem to put pressure on EMC.
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We can answer these questions by introducing a distinction between intramodal and
intermodal MMA/MMI, the latter of which allows us to mimetically engage with a target without
having extensive prior experience/knowledge about it.
Intramodal, or direct-matching MMA/MMI refers to imitation where one tries to match
the motor movements of another person by moving the same muscles as them in the same way
(in intramodal MMA) or imagining moving the same muscles in the same way (intramodal
MMI). Intramodal MMA can be observed in contexts where one mimics the playing of a
musician using the same instrument; intramodal MMI can be observed in contexts where one
imagines themself moving the same muscles as a dancer. Crucially, in intramodal mimetic
engagement, we seek to imitate all aspects of a target’s movement.
In contrast, intermodal, or cross-modal MMA/MMI refers to mimetic activity that
imitates some, but not all, aspect(s) of its target. For example, we may engage in acoustic
cross-modal imitation by singing or whistling the melody produced by an instrument. Such an
imitation fails to be a direct-matching, because the physical arrangement of our vocal chords
(which determines the sound that is produced) and that of any other instrument is simply
different. It is in this sense that we represent some aspect—pitch in this example—of what we
hear across modes, or ‘cross-modally’. We are using different muscles and actions than those
used by the original performer to mimic the original performance with respect to a particular
aspect of it. Similarly, we may engage in nonacoustic cross-modal imitation by bobbing our head
along to a rhythm. In these cases, we are imitating rhythmic aspects of heard sound.
Thus, our having a capacity for intermodal MMA/MMI explains how we can both engage
with sounds produced with instruments/techniques that we ourselves have never performed with
and engage with digital sounds. Despite perhaps not having the knowledge/experience necessary
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for intramodal MMA/MMI of musical sounds (mimicking all aspects of the motor actions that
caused them), one can still model the music on a more abstract level through intermodal
MMA/MMI (which only requires mimicking some aspects of the causal motor actions). In fact,
we can engage in Intermodal MMA/MMI when only mimetically engaging with singular aspects
of musical sounds such as their rhythmic or tonal profile (per the examples above). For example,
we can tap our foot along to the rhythms of a drummer or sing a melody played by a trumpeter.
While we may not all have extensive technical or theoretical knowledge of these instruments, we
have basic musical intuitions for a variety of components of the music they produce, for example
the rhythm and tonality (more on this in Section 5). This gives us enough to conceivably
cross-modally mimetically engage with all musical sounds (which characteristically have
rhythmic and tonal/harmonic components).
If we have an ability to mimetically engage with those musical sounds which we have no
direct knowledge/experience how to produce on the basis of abstract musical features, we can
apply this same ability to digital sounds which may have no existing acoustic musical instrument
that could be played to make the sounds digital instruments make.
Having explained how we mimetically engage with music, we can now move on to the
second thesis of EMC: mimetic engagement entails affect.
Recall the example of mimetic behavior in infants at the beginning of this section. The
infant observes a motor action, mimics it, and comes to associate the affect that is invoked in
them by performing the motor action with the action itself. This basic example can be used as a
model for understanding how affect entailed by all MMA: the affect we experience in MMA is
invoked by our performing (mimicking) a motor action, and we form motor action/affective state
associations on this basis.
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The associations we form between performed motor actions and invoked affective states
can then guide the invocation of affective states through MMI. We may come to draw a strong
association between smiling and the feeling of pleasure, say, through MMA. If this association is
strong enough, Cox conjectures that MMI of observed smiles could invoke the feeling of
pleasure in one’s self. Imagining ourselves performing the action involves imagining the affect
we would experience in performing the action, which consequently actually invokes the affect in
us to varying extents. Imagine, for a moment, accidently sliding your finger across the edge of an
envelope, resulting in the slow slicing of flesh. Did this imaginative exercise cause you to wince?
While you might not have felt pain with the same intensity of actually cutting your finger
(thankfully), it should have at least evoked a weaker/less vivid sense of pain (affective state).
This is enough to render Cox’s claim that MMI evokes affective states plausible.
So if both MMA and MMI involve the invocation of affect, and mimetic engagement just
means one is engaged in MMA or MMI, then mimetic engagement involves the invocation of
affective states. If this is true, and we mimetically engage with musical sounds, then we
experience affect when listening to music. We have now answered Q1.
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Section 4: Critical Evaluation of EMC
With this theoretical exposition behind us, we can now evaluate EMC’s propositions as
well as its role in the current project. Addressing these concerns will help us get clear on how
EMC could complement GMG, and what its role will be in developing the Analogical Argument.
One primary shortcoming of EMC is its limited scope. Although it provides a robust
explanation of how affect is invoked when listening to music, it seems to falter in explaining the
specific influence of tonal/harmonic patterns and regularities on musical meaning. These patterns
and regularities can be rhythmic or harmonic and observed in many musical patterns and
regularities such as metrical structures, keys/scales, melodic variation, etc. To take one specific
example, it’s not clear how EMC could explain the particular musical affect associated with
hearing the repetition of a chorus section of a composition. Explaining the role of such musical
patterns and regularities in musical affect is important because, perhaps the key distinguishing
feature between groups of pitch-time events that would standardly be labeled ‘music’ and those
that wouldn’t is some degree of organization (which is to say patterns and regularities) among
pitch-time events.7 Patterns and regularities thus seem fairly essential to what we would
standardly consider to be music.
To be sure, EMC does provide some explanation of rhythmic affect—affect invoked in
virtue of rhythmic patterns and regularities. We know what it is like to perform common
rhythmic motor actions—for example, walking—and we also know what sounds are associated
with the performance of these actions. When we hear sets of pitch-time events that have a similar
rhythmic profile to the sounds we associate with walking, we attribute the affect associated with
walking to the pitch-time events as an act of MMI. For example, a musical piece evoking a

7

To further reinforce this intuition, we can notice how distasteful a musical composition devoid of any rhythmic or
harmonic regularity sounds.
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feeling of excitement in us may be attributable, in part, to its rhythmic profile resembling the
rhythmic profile we would have in performing motor actions while excited (e.g. fast
movements).
However, EMC fails to account for the affective states that are invoked in virtue of
certain tonal/harmonic patterns and regularities. For example, major and minor chords, generally
invoke characteristically different affective states (often described as ‘happy’ or ‘sad’,
respectively). Though the difference in motor action that it takes to produce each of these chords
on almost any chordal instrument would be about as minute as the difference between reaching
for two adjacent keys on a computer keyboard. The core tenets of EMC would suggest that
differences in the affect invoked by certain sounds should be proportional8 to differences in their
physical causes. Given this, it is unclear how EMC could explain this stark difference in the
affect evoked on the basis of an unanalogously small difference in resembled motor action from
the perspective of EMC. Meanwhile, we can tell some story about how virtually any musical
rhythm acquires its affective attribution via resemblance with some rhythmic motor action or
another.
Like harmonic affect, EMC also struggles to account for tonal affect, or the affect
associated with tonality. EMC can account for some abstract tonal forms. For example, we may
hear a saxophone raise its pitch throughout a phrase and liken this to a person’s asking of a
question, where they may manipulate the pitch of their voice in the same way. There are myriad
resemblances we can identify between the pitches of instrumental phrases and speech acts: we
8

That is, differences in musically invoked affective states should be proportional, in some sense, to a difference in
associated motor action/imagery. There are different ways in which this ‘proportional correspondence’ could be
understood. For example, Cox appeals to what he calls exertion schema when explaining why certain sounds invoke
certain affective states; we might hear certain pitch-time events as being more intense than others in proportion to
the extent to which we associate these sounds with motor actions that involve great exertion, for example. Despite
there being different ways of understanding this ‘proportional correspondence’, there is no clear ‘proportional
correspondence’ between differences in harmonic affect and associated motor actions/imagery.
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can imagine a saxophone mimicking a groaning or screaming voice for example. However, this
does not explain how the feeling arises in virtue of a particular tonal organization of pitch-time
events. There are certain melodies that to some extent or another reliably invoke certain kinds of
affective states, and EMC does not explain why this is so—certainly not as comprehensively as
EMC’s explanation of rhythmic affect. With EMC’s account of rhythmic affect, we have an
explanation of how the components of rhythm, namely the individual beats, can be arranged so
as to resemble rhythmic motor actions. To have an analogously comprehensive account of
tonal/harmonic affect, we would need some explanation of how certain arrangements of
individual pitches could resemble motor actions (or the sounds they cause).
EMC may offer explanations of other sources of musical affect at an abstract level, but so
long as it doesn’t contend with the constitutive units of tonality/harmony (pitches), it fails to
comprehensively account for the myriad feelings that can be evoked in virtue of certain
tonal/harmonic organizations.
It is also worth noting EMC’s reliance on neuroscientific evidence when assessing its
claims. As with all neuroscientific evidence, we can not posit causal relationships among certain
patterns of neural activity (motor area activation) and certain mental states (mimetic
engagement). This is because all we can observe through the observation of neural activity is the
co-occurence of certain neural activations. However, the higher the reliability of this
co-occurrence, the more confidence we can have in certain patterns of neural activity and certain
mental states predicting each other. Given that the co-occurence of motor area activation and
overt motor actions/MMI is in fact highly reliable, we can be confident in the claims EMC
makes on the basis of this relationship.
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While these concerns certainly present problems for EMC, we should not let them
overshadow the immense value that the mimetic hypothesis offers. EMC presents a plausible,
scientific explanation of how music can invoke affect at all, distinguishing itself from numerous
past theories that fell short of this goal. This constitutes an answer to Q1. It also makes some
progress in explaining the question of how it could be that the affect that is invoked in musical
experience is non-arbitrarily related to heard musical sounds (Q2). Though to fully answer this
second question we will have to become acquainted with GMG, which I turn to now.
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Section 5: Theoretical Exposition of GMG
EMC has provided an answer to how pitch-time events can have affective meaning at all,
but there is more work to do to answer the question of why pitch-time events have the meaning
that they do (Q2). What we want is an explanation of the systematicity of musical affect. I will
argue that GMG’s interaction with the musical meanings provided by EMC provide this
explanation. This is the Analogical Argument alluded to in Section 1. The Analogical Argument,
which will be defended in Section 6, will argue that GMG mediates our relation of pitch-time
events so as to give rise to emergent musical meaning in essentially the same way (analogously)
that the cognitive processes posited by Noam Chomsky in his Theory of Generative Linguistic
Grammar (GLG) mediate our relation of terms so as to give rise to emergent linguistic meaning.
More specifically, the Analogical Argument can be summarized as follows: GMG represents the
musical analog for GLG’s linguistic grammar. EMC represents the musical analog for semantics.
Therefore, EMC and GMG facilitate the construal of musical meaning in a manner analogous to
how GLG facilitates the construal of linguistic meaning.
Given that GLG has had immense success in explaining emergent linguistic meaning
(and the systematicity of it), and that GMG employs the same Cognitivist approach as GLG, we
ought to expect that GMG can help explain emergent musical meaning as well as the
systematicity of it. Put simply, we should take GLG’s success as a theory of emergent linguistic
meaning to be indicative of GMG’s success as a theory of emergent musical meaning on the
basis that they both posit a grammar—a set of constraints on how we relate constitutive
components of complex linguistic expressions (GLG) or complex combinations of pitch-time
events (GMG).
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With the goal of the Analogical Argument in mind, I now give a brief overview of GLG,
so that we may be mindful of what it is we will be analogizing GMG to. I then proceed by
explaining the core tenets of GMG and elaborate on reasons we should take GMG to be an
equivalently useful theory for explaining the systematicity of musical meaning.
Briefly, GLG explains linguistic meaning by positing innate grammatical structures that
explain key features of linguistic competency. One such grammatical structure is syntax, the
cognitive process that mediates our understanding of language on the basis of the arrangement of
terms. According to GLG, syntactical rules facilitate the systematicity and compositionality of
language. ‘Systematicity’ in this context basically means that the meaning of linguistic
expressions are determined by the meanings of their constituent terms, and the syntactical
relations among them. For example, linguistic expressions such as ‘the tiger runs’ can not change
in meaning unless their constituent terms or the syntactical relations among them change, as
these determine the meaning of expression. ‘Compositionality’ in this context basically means
that understanding a complex linguistic expression ensures our understanding of other complex
linguistic expressions that have the same syntactic relations among terms, even when the
meanings of the terms are different. For example, one might know the meaning of the expression
‘the tiger runs fast’ as well as the meaning of the term ‘dog’. Even if we have somehow never
encountered the expression ‘the dog runs fast’, we can know what this phrase means by virtue of
compositionality. Additionally, semantics is the study of how linguistic terms have
meanings—how we associate certain concepts with certain terms.
We’re now ready to turn to GMG. Though before exploring the core tenets of GMG, I’d
like to make some preliminary remarks about the theory that will be relevant for present
purposes.
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Firstly, the primary goal of GMG is an account of how we generate structural
descriptions of music. The structural description is a mentally constructed formalization of
musical stimuli and relations among them (not unlike deep structures in GLG, which are
formalized descriptions of terms and relations among them). Lerdahl and Jackendoff take the
structural description to represent our musical understanding, and their theory outlines the
mechanics of the processes which lead to it.
Additionally, Lerdahl and Jackendoff are clear about only aspiring to give an account of
those aspects of musical cognition that are hierarchical. ‘Hierarchical’ in this context roughly
refers to our ability to make distinctions between local and global events/relative importance
within certain aspects of music (and ‘importance’ in this context roughly means having an
influence on how we hear other pitch-events). For example, we can create a hierarchy of rhythm
in a piece by grouping certain sections on the basis of rhythm, and making some evaluation of
which of these groupings are more influential to listening.
Non-hierarchical aspects of music include timbre, dynamics, and motivic-thematic
processes (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 9). These aspects cannot be easily organized hierarchically
because, put simply, hierarchical organizations require that one instance of the aspect being
organized could be considered subordinate to another instance. It is not clear what this would
mean for timbre, dynamics, and motivic-thematic processes, because they resist division into
levels or groupings of subordinate relations in a way rhythm, for example, does not.
While these non-hierarchical aspects of music are undoubtedly influential to musical
meaning, we need not worry too much about their omission in GMG. This is because, the
influence these aspects have on musical meaning could already be explained by EMC (certainly
with regards to timbre and dynamics). For example, the meaning associated with changes in
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dynamics (which is roughly synonymous to volume) could be accounted for by our associating
different affective states with louder or quieter sounds. Further, as will be outlined in Section 6,
what we want from GMG is a story of how musical meaning is influenced by relations among
pitch-time so as to give rise to emergent meaning. That these aspects can not be related (because
they are not hierarchical) disqualifies them from contributing to this goal.
Next, Lerdahl and Jackendoff do not make claims about the implications the structural
description or the processes that lead to it have for musical affect. This is because, in their words,
“...it is hard to say anything systematic [about affect] beyond crude statements such as observing
that loud and fast music tends to be exciting. To approach any of the subtleties of musical affect,
we assume, requires a better understanding of musical structure” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 8).
Having been familiarized with EMC, we may disagree with these assertions while at the same
time recognizing how they already suggest a complementary relationship between EMC and
GMG.
Finally, it is worth acknowledging how GMG’s being a theory of musical intuitions
renders its claims subject to tests of introspection. If there is some musical intuition concerning
how we group pitch-time events cross time, then we (or well-trained musicians, at the very least)
should be able to notice the role of this process in musical experience. This is not to say that we
should expect all listeners to be able to verbally report the hierarchical grouping structures that
they mentally generate while listening to music, but it is to say that the process of grouping
should be distinguishable enough from separate processes for us to be able to confidently say
that some process along those lines must exist.
To illustrate this notion, we can consider a linguistic example. When listening to spoken
language we can introspectively observe different cognitive processes at work, and with effort,
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recognize the ways in which they are distinct. We might hear a child say, “ice cream, me want”
and notice that, while we may be able to understand the meaning the child wishes to convey,
their statement is somehow ill-formed (not well-formed). The error we detect is not necessarily
about the meaning of the words used, but rather their arrangement in the sentence. This ought to
indicate that there is some linguistic intuition having to do with sentence structure at work
(namely syntax) that is distinguishable from another linguistic intuition that deals with the
meaning of words (namely semantics). We need only consult these intuitions through
introspection to be able to tell them apart. It is this kind of introspection that ought to be
analogously applicable to musical intuitions.
We can see this ability exhibited in considering what might standardly be considered
music. For those sequences of pitch-time events that would standardly be considered music (or a
musical piece), surely none would have ten-minute gaps of silence in the middle or have
melodies where every note is five octaves away from the previous note.9 Such collections of
pitch-time events would seem to defy intuitive constraints for music, and do so on the basis of
organizational features. The “song” with a ten-minute period of silence may be universally
labeled as music if we simply eliminate this period of silence—notably, all that would change is
the temporal distribution of pitch-time events (rhythm). Similarly, the “song” with melodies
where every note is four octaves away from the previous note could be universally labeled as
music if we simply put all adjacent pitch-time in the same (or adjacent) octaves—notably, all that
would change is the pitch distribution of the pitch-time events (tonality).

9

The distance between two notes with respect to pitch is an interval. Put simply, an ‘octave’ is a relatively large
interval. The intervallic relationships among adjacent pitch-time events in the vast majority of popular melodies (and
melodies we would standardly label as music) are generally much smaller than an octave. It is on this basis that an
interval of five octaves among adjacent pitch-time events is intuitively unmusical.
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These cases highlight rhythmic and tonal intuitions, respectively. They demonstrate how
our intuitions can guide our theorization of musical cognition; the rhythmic intuition just
described suggests the necessity of something like the grouping structure Lerdahl and Jackendoff
posit, and the harmonic intuition suggests the necessity of something like the prolongational
reduction Lerdahl and Jackendoff posit, for example. While we might not definitively know what
the processes are, we can know certain things about what they must be like. Thus, tests of
introspection can provide support for GMG insofar as they align with the processes posited by
Lerdahl and Jackendoff.10 I turn now to the main tenets of GMG.
There are four main cognitive processes that Lerdahl and Jackendoff posit as generating
our structural descriptions (which I will simply refer to as ‘processes’ moving forward): 1.
grouping structure, 2. metrical structure, 3. time-span reduction, and 4. prolongational reduction.
Additionally, GMG posits a distinction between well-formedness rules and preference rules. In
the context of GLG, well-formedness refers to whether or not a linguistic expression adheres to
grammatical rules. In the context of GLG, well-formedness rules specify the possible structural
descriptions that a given piece can have, while preference rules determine which structural
descriptions are ultimately adopted.
Such a distinction is needed because in music it is possible to generate different, but
equally valid structural descriptions for any given piece, where ‘valid’ just means that the
description abides by well-formedness rules. This is in contrast to language, where there is only
one correct structural description, or deep-structure, for any given well-formed statement—this is
10

There exists some empirical support for GMG, and experiments could in principle be designed to test any of the
listener’s intuitions about the structural components of music. This is because all of GMG’s claims are about
cognitive processes, and cognitive science has already developed robust scientific methods for the experimental
testing of hypotheses about cognitive processes. Lerdahl and Jackendoff hypothesize that these structural
descriptions can then be compared to the cognitive processes they lay out. The research that has been conducted in
this regard generally supports the existence of the kinds of processes that Lerdahl and Jackendoff posit (Hansen,
2010).
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because it is based on strict term-definition relationships11. Music is not strict in this way, but
rather relationally defined (an argument that will be defended in Section 7). This allows for some
variation in the kinds of structural descriptions that are valid, though the variation among these
descriptions is first constrained by well-formedness rules, which specify the function of each
process and the domains in which they’re to be applied. In other words, while well-formedness
rules determine the kinds of inferences to be performed on audial stimuli, preference rules
determine the manner and extent to which they are applied. As an example, we can consider
grouping structure’s third well-formedness rule which says that ‘A group may contain smaller
groups’ (see Figure 4 on the next page for illustration). This rule allows for smaller groupings of
pitch-time events, but it is constrained by grouping structure’s first preference-rule, which says to
‘avoid analyses with very small groups—the smaller, the less preferable’. The well-formedness
rule defines the kind of inference to be performed, while the preference-rule determines the
extent and manner to which the well-formedness rule applies.
The preference rules in fact do most of the work in this theory, though they are omitted
here. Instead, an understanding of the functions of the cognitive processes (well-formedness
rules) themselves is most important for present purposes. This is because the Analogical
Argument will rely on a musical analogy to GLG, and well-formedness rules are sufficient for
supporting this analogy.
Briefly, I will now define each of the four processes GMG posits:
1. Grouping structure refers to, “...hierarchical segmentation of the piece into motives,
phrases and sections” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 8). At a broad level, this component of musical
11

Granted, in some cases it might be ambiguous what the correct structural description of a well-formed statement is
when considered in isolation (e.g. “The boy saw the man with the telescope.”). However, determining the correct
structural description of such statements would be a matter of knowing the meaning that it was meant to convey.
This is still in contrast to music where different structural descriptions could be considered valid even when there is
agreement about what musical meaning was sought to be conveyed by a particular musical passage.
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grammar is analogous to visual Gestalt psychology which posits that we group objects in our
visual field on the basis of their similarity. Consider the following figure:

Figure 4

We tend to group the black dots with the other black dots along the same row, and white dots
with other white dots along the same row, on the basis of similarity. In the same way we have
this innate capacity to group similar objects in our visual field, we group pitch-time events into
motives, phrases, and sections:

Figure 5

These groupings differ in terms of how local/global they are, though they all indicate some
thematic cohesion (basically, a kind of similarity) among pitch-time events.
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2. Metrical structure refers to, “...the intuition that the events of the piece are related to a
regular alternation of strong and weak beats at a number of hierarchical levels” (Lerdahl and
Jackendoff, 8). ‘Strong’ and ‘weak’ in this context refer to the extent to which a beat interacts, or
occurs simultaneously, with other beats at different levels of hierarchical organization. Metrical
structure is formalized in the following:

Figure 6

Put simply, the columns with more dots (beats) are ‘stronger’. Metrical structure is related to
grouping structure in that it indicates the temporal ‘backdrop’ on which musical groupings are
situated. Importantly, this metrical structure is regular in that the lowest level of its hierarchy is
composed of equally-spaced time segments, and all events at higher levels of the hierarchy align
with some segment at the lowest level.
3. Time-span reduction, “...assigns to the pitches of the piece a hierarchy of ‘structural
importance’ with respect to their position in grouping and metrical structure” (Lerdahl and
Jackendoff, 8). To unpack this, metrical structure deals strictly with the temporal organization of
pitch-time events whereas grouping deals more directly with their melodic/thematic cohesion.
Both of these more basic processes assign a certain relative importance (again, ‘importance’
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indicates certain pitch-time events having implications for how we hear other pitch-time events)
to pitch-time events, and their interaction gives way to a more abstract kind of relative
importance—namely time-span reduction. This is illustrated in the following:

Figure 7

The role of grouping and metrical structure in determining time-spans can vary by how global
the level of analysis is: at local levels, time-spans can be totally determined by metrical structure.
On more global levels, time-spans can be totally determined by grouping structure. This variance
in role occurs on a gradual basis.
4. Prolongational reduction, “...assigns to the pitches a hierarchy that expresses harmonic
and melodic tension and relaxation” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 9). Prolongational reduction, as
well as the rest of the processes thus described, are formalized in the following:
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Figure 8

Prolongational reduction is difficult if not impossible to define on a purely formal basis because
it is defined in terms of tension and relaxation, which become apparent in musical
experience—they are things we feel in response to music (as opposed to merely representing,
though certain representations in structural descriptions are strongly correlated with
tension/relaxation). This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that the tension and relaxation in a
piece can be modified by tonality and/or rhythm. With respect to pitch, tension can be
manipulated by the amount of dissonance among the pitches of different pitch-time events.
Though there is not a direct correlation between pitch dissonance and tension; the kind of
dissonance, as well as time the dissonance is introduced, are both influential in how overall
tension is modified. Rhythmic tension can be increased with greater speed or rhythmic
irregularity, for example, where irregularity roughly refers to a lack of overlap between grouping
and metrical descriptions.
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There is also not a direct correlation between speed/irregularity and tension; the tension is
emergent from particular styles and placements of speed/irregularity in relation to the rest of the
piece. This complexity is then further exacerbated by the interaction rhythmic tension has with
tonal/harmonic tension. Again, GMG fails to account for why such relationships obtain because
it is not concerned with affect. Though we take prolongational reduction to be highly indicative
of the patterns of tension/relaxation that we would hear in musical experience because certain
formal patterns are highly associated with certain affective states. Presumably, this is because
these formal patterns, when realized in musical experience, reliably lead to the invocation of
certain affective states via EMC. As previously mentioned, GMG’s inability to account for
musical affect here further demonstrates the potential contributions of the Analogical
Argument—unifying GMG with EMC would provide a theoretical basis for explaining the
correlational relationship certain formal descriptions of music have with the affect they evoke.
We are now familiar with both GMG and GLG. Again, the core proposal of the
Analogical Argument is the idea that GMG could be analogized to GLG, such that GMG could
explain how musical meaning emerges in the same way that GLG explains how linguistic
meaning emerges. We are ready to begin substantiating this analogical relationship. I turn to this
substantiation in Section 6.
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Section 6: The Analogical Argument
Now that we are armed with knowledge of both EMC and GMG, we can begin exploring
the ways they interact. Our main goal remains the explication of musical meaning, and the task
of providing this explanation can be guided by the following variation on Q2: if EMC basically
says that the affect invoked by music is the affect we experience in motor action, then in virtue of
what is musical experience not affectively cacophonous? That is, if all the different sounds that
constitute a piece of music each invoke some distinct affective state, why do we seemingly
experience aggregates of these affective states systematically and reliably in musical experience,
and not a disordered conglomeration of them?12 In the remainder of this thesis, I demonstrate
that this question can be answered by the Analogical Argument. This argument can be
summarized as follows: GMG represents the musical analog for linguistic grammar. EMC
represents the musical analog for semantics. Therefore, EMC and GMG facilitate the construal
of musical meaning in a manner analogous to how GLG facilitates the construal of linguistic
meaning.
The Analogical Argument will, of course, be centered around analogies between
language and music. Though, these analogies have their limits, and it will eventually become
easier to characterize musical meaning through disanalogies with language. These disanalogies
will prominently include the relational nature of musical meaning, and the resistance music has
to the kind of total incomprehensibility that can be found in ill-formed linguistic utterances. It is
also worth mentioning that the Analogical Argument, while primarily emphasizing those aspects
of language and music that are analogous, will be interspersed with caveats defining the exact
extent and manner in which certain aspects of music and language can be analogized. One should
12

For example, when we hear melodies, we don’t experience the musical meaning (affective states) of the different
pitch-time events in the melody separately, but rather hear the melody itself as having its own meaning. It is in this
sense that we experience ‘aggregates’ of elemental musically invoked affective states.
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not expect any of the analogies presented here to have perfect one-to-one correspondence across
domains.
In presenting these ideas, I begin by clarifying the problem posed by the motivating
questions presented at the beginning of this section. I then explain the Analogical Argument.
Finally, I further characterize our understanding of musical meaning via disanalogies with
language.
To fully grasp the weight of the problem posed by this section’s motivating question of
why we experience the aggregate affective states that we do in musical experience (and not a
disordered conglomeration of distinct affective states), we can (unsurprisingly) rely on analogies
to language: When crafting sentences, we arrange words in certain orders so as to convey a
particular meaning. The meanings of sentences are, in part, determined by the meanings of the
terms that constitute them. Though crucially, the meanings of sentences go beyond the meaning
of terms themselves—there is an emergent meaning that is understood via a linguistic grammar
(GLG).
We can consider the terms ‘tiger’, ‘run’, and ‘fast’. Each of these terms have different
meanings, and when they are arranged in a particular order so as to form a sentence (ex. ‘tiger(s)
run fast’), there is an emergent meaning that is not contained within any of the meanings of the
individual terms. We can know this because while the sentence contains the meaning of each
term, it also contains some other meaning. Namely, the meaning that tigers run fast. The fact that
this meaning cannot be reduced to more basic components of the sentence without sacrificing
something further reinforces the idea that the sentence carries a meaning of its own, distinct from
the meaning of its constituent terms/concepts. It has an emergent meaning, determined by its
constituent terms.
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Notice that the emergent meaning of the sentence is also not contained in a mere
agglomeration of terms. To confirm this, we can consider other such word orders:

Utterance

Well-Formedness

‘Tiger fast run’

Ill-Formed

‘Fast tiger(s) run’

Well-Formed

‘Fast run tiger’

Ill-Formed

‘Run tiger fast’

Ill-Formed

‘Run fast tiger’

Could be well-formed if we
charitably interpret this utterance
as a command: ‘Run fast, tiger’

Certain permutations of these terms give rise to an emergent meaning at the level of the sentence,
and others don’t. The question then is, in virtue of what are some of these utterances not mere
agglomerations of terms? This is the same situation we currently find ourselves in with respect
to music.
In language, we now know that the sentence’s emergent meaning is attributable to a
linguistic grammar, which GLG explains. The ‘tigers run fast’ exercise above serves to highlight
the role of syntactic rules, posited by GLG, in linguistic meaning. Those sentences that are
well-formed, and therefore have emergent sentential meaning, are those that abide by
grammatical rules. We can now more pointedly rephrase our motivating question as what
musical analog could there be for linguistic grammar?
With this, we can begin developing the Analogical Argument. Once more, this argument
can be summarized as follows: GMG represents the musical analog for linguistic grammar
(GLG). EMC represents the musical analog for semantics. Therefore, EMC and GMG facilitate
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the construal of musical meaning in a manner analogous to how GLG facilitates the construal of
linguistic meaning. I now explain these assertions in turn, beginning with ‘GMG represents the
musical analog for linguistic grammar’.
Given that GLG deals in relations among terms, we ought to consider what the musical
analog of these might be in order to properly analogize GMG and GLG. Put simply, terms are
basic units of linguistic meaning. They are the smallest linguistic units which can be said to have
distinct meanings. Moving forward, I’ll refer to the smallest unit of meaning (in music or
language) as a ‘morpheme’: the most basic element that can be said to carry a unique meaning.
As mentioned, linguistic morphemes are terms. With regards to music, defining the morpheme is
a much more difficult task. It could be argued that in a hierarchy of musical classification (ex.
note, melody, section, composition), the note would have to constitute a morpheme on the basis
that those with absolute pitch experience distinct feelings for certain notes: there’s a feeling of
what it’s like to hear a G-sharp for those with absolute pitch that is distinct from the feelings
invoked by hearing other notes. If the invocation of a distinct affective state is the criteria we are
using to determine whether a musical sound has meaning (as we have done in discussions of
EMC), then it seems as if individual notes would have to carry meaning.
However, absolute pitch is rare. The vast majority of listeners of music have relative
pitch, which basically means that they don’t recognize individual notes as invoking particularly
distinct feelings. Rather, meaning is evoked by musical sounds in virtue of the relationships
between them: while an isolated note might not evoke a distinct feeling, two notes heard
simultaneously or in succession could evoke a feeling that is distinct to their intervallic
relationship (how far the notes are from each other with respect to pitch). One may still contend
that, even for those with relative pitch, isolated pitches can have affective meaning in virtue of
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subtle forms of MMI—in this case, distinct feelings would be evoked by our knowing something
of what it would be like to produce the sound ourselves, not necessarily by the sound’s pitch.
This is a valid concern that is worth considering and serves to emphasize how difficult it can be
to define a threshold for musical meaning. Though to illustrate why isolated pitches would not
constitute musical morphemes, we can consider those we encounter in everyday life; we do not
standardly consider the sound of a train horn or the ringing of a digital alarm clock to be ‘music’,
nor would we say these sounds invoke affective states to a significant extent. On the other hand,
we could imagine how the same sounds would be considered ‘music’ if they were varied in pitch
and/or had some rhythmic organization.
With these complexities in mind, our best route forward is to abandon the goal of finding
a precise definition for musical morphemes. Rather, we can rely on our shared intuitions about
what juncture in a hierarchy of musical classification evokes musical meaning that meets some
(undefined) threshold level of salience/vividness, and this will be sufficient for our purposes.
This threshold could be satisfied by a short melody or a single chord for example. While it may
very well be the case that we construe meaning from individual notes on the basis of MMI, it’s
not clear that this meaning would be a particularly salient or vivid one; on the other hand, most
would agree that short melodies or individual chords would have a salient/vivid meaning such
that these sounds would be widely regarded as musical.
We can now return to the present claim that GMG represents the musical analog for
GLG. I will unpack this claim by considering how all of the cognitive processes posited by GMG
(grouping structure, metrical structure, time-span reduction, and prolongational reduction) might
map on to this analogy. Thus, in order to substantiate the claim that GMG represents the musical
analog for GLG, I will argue that: Sub-sentential grammatical structures can be roughly
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analogized to GMG’s grouping structure and metrical structure, sentential grammatical structures
(as well as more complex grammatical structures) can be roughly analogized to GMG’s
time-span and prolongational reduction, and culturally- or context-dependent applications of
syntax can be roughly analogized to GMG’s preference rules. I now explain these assertions in
turn.
The claim that sub-sentential grammatical structures can be roughly analogized to
GMG’s grouping structure and metrical structure is made on the basis that sub-sentential
grammatical structures, and grouping and metrical structure, fulfill analogous roles in the
construal of meaning. Firstly, when speaking of ‘sub-sentential grammatical structures’, I refer to
grammatical structures such as verb phrases, noun phrases, prepositional phrases, etc.; these are
‘sub-sentential’ in the sense that they could not independently constitute a well-formed sentence.
Sub-sentential grammatical structures fulfill analogous roles to grouping and metrical
structure in that, while they can contribute to emergent meaning, they are not sufficient for
constituting what we can call a ‘complete thought’ or ‘complete expression’. For example, we
can consider the noun phrase, ‘the majestic tiger’, and notice that it intuitively seems to be
missing something (“What about the majestic tiger?”). Similarly, we can consider the verb
phrase, ‘is running quickly’. Considered in isolation, this verb phrase, a sub-sentential
grammatical structure, also intuitively seems to be missing something (“What, or who, is running
quickly?”).
This sense that something is missing from these statements is the intuition that a
‘complete thought’ has not been expressed (moving forward, I’ll refer to these as ‘complete
expressions’, as this term is more clearly applicable to music). This is because complete
expressions generally require both a subject, and some idea about, or involving, the subject. For
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example, ‘the majestic tiger is running quickly’, has both of these attributes: the majestic tiger is
the subject and ‘running quickly’ is some idea involving the subject. This is therefore a complete
expression.
That grouping and metrical structures are both insufficient for constituting complete
expressions is suggested by the fact that they could just as easily accurately represent myriad
different musical passages, all of which would have distinct meanings. This is not unlike how we
could imagine the noun/verb phrases presented above as belonging to myriad different
well-formed sentences (e.g. ‘The majestic tiger gazed menacingly’, ‘The majestic tiger
passionately plays the harp’). To highlight this point, we can simply observe how two pieces
evoke different feelings when they differ only in tonality. For example, we can consider ‘Happy
Birthday’ in a major 13 and minor14 key. Because grouping and metrical structure deal only in
rhythmic relationships in a piece, and these different versions of ‘Happy Birthday’ differ only
with respect to the pitches of their constitutive pitch-time events15, we can be confident that
either version of this piece shares exactly the same grouping and metrical structure. Nonetheless,
they invoke different feelings. This is analogous to how sub-sentential grammatical structures
could subsist myriad different emergent sentential meanings without constituting a complete
expression on their own. It is in this sense that grouping and metrical structure can be analogized
to sub-sentential grammatical structures.
Sentential (and more complex) grammatical structures can be roughly analogized to
GMG’s prolongational reduction and time-span reduction. This claim is made on the basis that
both sentential grammatical structures and prolongational/time-span reduction fulfill analogous
13

Happy Birthday - Major Key
Happy Birthday - Minor Key
15
These pieces are in major and minor keys of the same root, which basically means that the difference in the
pitches of the pitch-times constituting the piece is minimal, and despite this we can observe a marked difference in
the affect they invoke.
14
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roles in facilitating the emergent meaning of complete expressions. With regards to language, we
can support this claim by recognizing that the reason ‘the majestic tiger gazed menacingly’ is a
complete expression is because sentential grammatical structures relate the meanings of these
sub-sentential grammatical structures to each other.
To outline this particular analogy, we can recall the following: time-span reduction,
“...assigns to the pitches of the piece a hierarchy of ‘structural importance’ with respect to their
position in grouping and metrical structure” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 8). Again, importance in
this context roughly refers to the extent to which a group of pitch-time events has influence over
how we hear other pitch-time events. Also, prolongational reduction, “...assigns to the pitches a
hierarchy that expresses harmonic and melodic tension and relaxation” (Lerdahl and Jackendoff,
9). While time-span reduction and prolongational reduction are more closely associated with
rhythm and tonality respectively, they each assign hierarchies of structural importance to music.
These processes are analogous to sentential grammatical structures in the sense that they
determine how we relate those aspects of musical structural organization that subsist complete
expressions; more specifically, they determine how we relate grouping and metrical structure,
which don’t give way to emergent meaning on their own, so as to give way to emergent meaning.
We can think of sentential grammatical structures as organizing and relating sub-sentential
grammatical structures on the basis of their function within a sentence. By assigning terms
complementary functional roles within a sentence (ex. subject-verb-object), we can know how
the meanings of the individual terms ought to be related so as to give rise to an emergent
sentential meaning. As a basic example, we can consider ‘Tigers run’. ‘Tigers’ and ‘run’ have
particular meanings when considered in isolation, though in identifying each term as the subject
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and verb within a sentence respectively, we are led to interpret the terms such that we can
construe emergent sentential meaning.
Similarly in music, we can think of Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s concept of structural
‘importance’ as a kind of syntactical function that certain pitch-time events can instantiate.
Indeed, our working definition of importance just is the property of certain pitch-time events
influencing how we understand other pitch-time events—not unlike the way identifying ‘tigers’
as a subject influences our understanding of ‘run’ as something the subject (tigers) does. Contrast
this with the meaning of ‘run’ considered in isolation: something that things (not necessarily the
relevant subject, tigers) do. The specification of the function of certain pitch-time events would
then determine how we relate the meanings of different pitch-time events with each other in
complementary ways, and consequently give rise to an emergent meaning that is not inherent in
any of the individual musical morphemes, or grouping and metrical structures.
Indeed, this analogous relationship between syntax and time-span/prolongational
reduction can be superficially appreciated in noticing how similarly they are formalized:

Figure 9

Syntactical Structure
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Figure 10

Prolongational/Time-Span Reduction

GMG’s preference rules can be roughly and broadly analogized to more context- and
culturally-dependent applications of syntax. I begin with the musical component of this claim.
Recall that preference rules are not cognitive processes in and of themselves. Rather, they
determine the manner and extent to which well-formedness rules (which essentially just are the
four cognitive processes constituting GMG) are applied to heard musical stimuli. Importantly,
Lerdahl and Jackendoff claim that well-formedness rules are universal among listeners, while
preference rules can vary on the basis of an individual’s previous exposure to music—a unique
history of musical experiences can lead to unique proclivities with regards to the structural
description. For example, listeners from different cultures have been observed to prefer metrical
structures with different metrical levels when presented with the same musical stimuli (Cameron,
et. al, 2015).
Similarly, context- and culturally-dependent applications of syntax are not universal. It is
in virtue of our having had musical experiences particular to a culture or context that we can
understand the meaning of such idiosyncratic applications of syntactic rules.
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However, we ought to keep in mind that GMG cannot be responsible for all idiosyncratic
interpretations of musical meaning—the affect that is invoked by mimetic engagement is also
subject to variation through varied experience. In some cases, this variation might be such that
two different listeners characterize a passage using descriptors with categorically different
meanings (e.g. ‘gleeful’ and ‘triumphant’). This is in contrast to language where highly disparate
experiences may lead to slightly varied understanding of terms, but often still lead to the same
essential meanings. With this, we can now consider the role of EMC in the Analogical
Argument.
EMC can be roughly analogized to GLG’s semantics. Again, semantics is the study of
linguistic meaning, as opposed to the other cognitive processes which all either mediate the
construal of meaning or take meaning as their input. Semantics is how meaning is introduced to
our language processing at all. Similarly, EMC deals in affective meaning directly through
previously described processes of mimetic engagement. This is in contrast to GMG, which deals
in organizational representations of musical stimuli. Again, Lerdahl and Jackendoff make clear
that GMG is not meant to be an explanation of musical affect. However, once affect (meaning)
has been introduced by mimetic engagement with musical sounds, the structural description
generated by GMG relates these sounds and their associated affective meaning so as to give rise
to an emergent meaning not inherent in any of the individual morphemes.
To review, in language we have terms/concepts and relations among them; linguistic
grammar is the mechanism by which these relational structures are competently ascertained as
well as generated so as to give rise to emergent sentential meanings. In music, we have
sounds/affective meanings and relations among them. EMC explains the process by which we
arrive at these associations between sounds and affective meanings. GMG, broadly, is the
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mechanism by which these relational structures are competently ascertained as well as generated
so as to give rise to an emergent musical meaning.
This is generally as far as analogies to language will get us in understanding musical
meaning. Though disanalogies to language prove similarly useful.
The first disanalogy to recognize is that musical sounds don’t have veridicality conditions
in the way linguistic utterances do—this is to say that they can’t be ‘wrong’ in the common sense
of the term. For example, the expression ‘Tammy the tiger runs fast’ could be true or false on the
basis that its meaning is in accordance with certain facts about the world. If Tammy the tiger in
fact runs fast, then this statement is true. If Tammy the tiger in fact runs slow, this statement is
false. Linguistic utterances have veridicality conditions because terms represent things in the
world. Terms are about things, and by extension, so are sentences. If what a statement is saying
about some thing, state of affairs, etc. is not in accordance with the facts of the matter, then the
statement is false.
If EMC is correct, then music has no such veridicality conditions because musical sounds
do not refer to or represent things in the external world—they aren’t about things. Rather,
musical sounds simply invoke affective states we have or have had in performing motor actions.
Where terms refer to external things, musical sounds invoke internal things. This invocation of
affective states resists veridicality because we can’t be wrong or right when we feel. Feelings
themselves aren’t about the world in the same way terms are. If we stub our toe against a hard
surface, in what sense can we be wrong about when we feel pain?16 We know when linguistic
statements are wrong by investigating facts about the world. Though with regard to affective
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To be sure, there are cases where we may be ‘wrong’ in our belief that ‘I am in pain’. For example, we could
consider psychosomatic conditions such as phantom limb syndrome. However, even in these cases, it is true that
people experience pain; pain is a part of their phenomenology as if it in fact did have physiological causes. This is
the sense of ‘wrong’ we are interested in.
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states, we can only ‘investigate’ through introspection/awareness of the contents of our
consciousness.
However, our interpretation of musical meaning can be ‘wrong’ in the sense that we
could generate a structural description that is in fact an incorrect application of well-formedness
rules to a particular musical stimulus. GMG’s well-formedness rules have sufficient conditions
that can either be satisfied or not satisfied by musical stimuli. For example, we can consider
metrical structure’s first well-formedness rule: Every attack point must be associated with a beat
at the smallest metrical level present at that point in the piece. Therefore, if our structural
description is such that there is an attack point that lies between two segments of our metrical
structure, then we have generated an incorrect structural description. Further, there can be a fact
of the matter as to whether distal musical stimuli satisfy such conditions because they are based
on objective features of pitch-time events. With regards to metrical structure’s first
well-formedness rule, an attack point is the ‘front end’ of a sound—it refers to the moment at
which a sound begins. We can objectively determine the occurrence of an attack point by
identifying when a sound begins following a period of silence (through using a microphone to
measure volume levels, for example). All of the well-formedness rules postulated by GMG are
subject to such tests of satisfaction. Therefore, we can objectively determine when an incorrect
structural description has been generated.
This brings us to our next disanalogy: while an incorrect application of linguistic
grammar rules (e.g. ‘fast run tiger’) fails to result in an emergent meaning, incorrect structural
descriptions can still give rise to emergent meaning. To understand how this is so, we must first
recognize the relational nature of musical meaning. Musical morphemes may have a particular
meaning when heard in isolation, but this meaning can be significantly augmented by placing
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this morpheme in different musical contexts. For example, we can consider ‘the lick’—a melody
constituted by seven notes that is often used in jazz music, among other genres.17 Depending on
the context, the musical meaning of ‘the lick’, and of musical morphemes more generally, can be
of a categorical difference: the same melody can sound happy or sad depending on the context.
Contrast this with linguistic terms whose meaning is stable regardless of their context.
‘Tigers’ refers to tigers whether we say ‘tigers run fast’, ‘tigers have found a cure for cancer’,
‘this song is an ode to tigers’, etc. Granted, there may be instances where a term’s meaning is
varied. For example, ‘she’s a tiger on the trade floor’ employs a metaphorical use of the term
‘tiger’. Nonetheless, such uses of terms fundamentally rely on the stable, essential meaning that
the term has in isolation; it is only in virtue of the word’s stable, essential meaning that it has the
metaphorical meaning that it does in certain contexts.
This serves to demonstrate how musical morphemes can have implications on each
other’s meaning. To further illustrate this possibly counterintuitive notion, we can consider
analogies to vision. Gestalt Psychology has identified principles of visual perception such as
good continuation and completion. When these principles are applied to visual perceptions, such
as patterns of dots, we see the placement of some dots as having implications for the placement
of others (Koopman and Davies, 2001).
We can consider the following figure as a visual situation in which we find such Gestalt
principles in action:

17

‘The Lick’ in different musical contexts.
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Figure 11

While there is nothing in the arrangement of these dots explicitly indicating that they fall along
the edge of a circle, we perceive them as having a circular orientation nonetheless. One of the
groups of three dots in this figure may seem to display a pattern of being oriented around an arc.
We have an expectation that other dots will continue this pattern, and therefore see them as such,
as opposed to simply perceiving the dots as dots and not inferring a pattern to their positioning at
all. It is in this sense that the placement of the dots have implications for each other.
So too in music, past pitch-time events have implications for how we hear future
pitch-time events: possible patterns and regularities may predispose us to want to hear that
pattern or regularity be continued. This relational nature of musical meaning then explains how
we can have emergent meaning from a set of pitch-time events even when our structural
description is wrong. Even when our structural description is wrong, it still specifies some
relation among heard pitch-time events. All that is needed to construe emergent musical meaning
is morphemes (EMC) and relations among them (GMG). Linguistic meaning may be
characterized similarly, but crucially, we must recall: syntax requires that words be able to fulfill
certain complementary functions so as to contribute to a complete expression, among other
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things. There is no emergent meaning that comes from a sentence exclusively composed of
nouns, for example: ‘tiger tiger tiger’. This is because, at least very generally, sentences require a
subject and some idea about or involving them. We can have complete expressions when the
terms that constitute a sentence fulfill complementary functional roles. For example, in ‘tigers
run fast’ these words fulfill the syntactic functions of subject-verb-adverb (in the order that they
appear).
This is in contrast to music, where there is no such division of functional roles. The
musical analog of syntax—time-span and prolongational reduction—deals only in one function.
Namely, importance. Because there is only one function in ‘musical syntax’, it can be fulfilled by
any musical morpheme. Therefore, so long as a structural description specifies some hierarchical
relationship among pitch-time events on the basis of importance, then emergent musical meaning
can be construed, regardless of whether or not the structural description is in fact in accordance
with heard musical stimuli.
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Section 7: Towards a Theory of Musical Understanding
Thus far, what has been presented is a theory of musical meaning; a theory of why music
invokes affective states, and why it invokes the affective states that it does. We can now explore
some notable implications the theory would have if it is true.
I’d like to begin this elaboration by considering the strength of a possible analogical
relationship between musical meaning and linguistic meaning that has hitherto been left
unexplored—namely, the extent to which each is universally accessible. Now that we have a
story about what musical meaning is, we can inquire into the extent to which it is shared.
In language, determining whether some linguistic meaning has been understood by
others18 can be fairly straightforward. Often you can tell whether your expression has been
understood based on whether a fellow interlocutor’s expression or behaviors are consistent with
the meaning of what you’ve said. If they respond with something completely unrelated to or
inconsistent with what you’ve said, they’ve likely misunderstood you. There are instances in
which it’s unclear whether we’ve been understood: a conversation might get cut off before we
get a response, for example. Though even in such cases, we can expect that knowing whether
we’ve been understood would just be a matter of asking someone to respond to or rephrase what
we’ve said, and seeing whether this corresponds with the meaning of what we’ve said.
Determining whether a musical meaning has been understood is a more complex and
difficult task. Firstly, we should recognize a disanalogy between what it means to ‘understand’ a
linguistic expression and what it would mean to ‘understand’ a musical expression, if
‘understanding’ can be appropriately applied to musical meaning at all. In language,
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By ‘others’ here, I refer to other humans. There exist AI chatbots that can generate appropriate linguistic responses
to statements, but it’s not clear they understand these responses in the same way humans do.

62

understanding should result in the same conceptual understanding in the minds of both the
expresser and interpreter.
For music, insofar as it is a communicative apparatus, successful communication can not
be a matter of achieving the same conceptual understanding because musical meaning is not
essentially conceptual, but rather essentially affective. What we seem to mean when we say that
a musical meaning has been understood is that the same, or sufficiently similar, affective states
have been invoked in the minds of both the expresser and interpreter, or at least among
interpreters.19 Admittedly, the sense of ‘similar’ I use here is a broad one. We want to allow for
varying affective responses to music to constitute a musical understanding because
requiring identical affective states would be too chauvinistic; any difference in invoked affective
states among listeners would disqualify the presence of an understanding. Worse, even if there
somehow was a musical understanding in this chauvinistic sense, we would never be able to
confirm that this was the case because it is impossible to definitively know the affective
character of another’s mental state. That is, we can’t definitively know the affective nature of
their subjective experience in the same way we know the nature of our own subjective
experience (Nagel, 1974).
In addition to not requiring that affective states be identical among listeners in order for
musical understanding to be achieved, we also don’t want to allow for individually relativistic
affective responses to constitute an understanding. If the affective states of listeners shared no
meaningful resemblance at all, this would go against the very definition of ‘understanding’.
Though, we can have confidence that the musical affective responses of different listeners are not
individually relativistic for the same reason we don’t worry about the absence of similarities
19

There exist artificial intelligences that can generate musical compositions which are basically indistinguishable
compositions authored by humans (Cope, 2013), but we wouldn’t say that these AIs understand the music they
generate in the relevant (affective) sense.
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among the mental states of others at large. Being unable to definitively know the character of the
mental states of others, we can still have confidence that our approximations of others’ mental
states are accurate with some significant degree of fidelity; while we might not know whether
someone is experiencing the exact same sadness (for example) we’ve experienced, we can know
that they feel some kind of sadness along these lines such that we are justified in forming beliefs,
claims, decisions, etc. on the basis of their verbal reports, bodily gestures, etc. Call this level of
confidence, which grounds safe inferences of another’s mental state, approximate knowledge of
another’s mental states. Contrast this with what we will call definitive knowledge of another’s
mental states; a precise knowledge of what it would be like to experience another’s mental state.
Definitive knowledge of another's mental states can not be attained, though approximate
knowledge can be. Thus, we can say that a musical understanding has been achieved when one
could justifiably have approximate knowledge that the musically invoked affective states among
listeners resemble each other. In this way, we can avoid both chauvinistic and overly relativistic
requirements for musical understanding.
Again, as has hopefully been demonstrated, defining musical understanding in rigorous
terms is a complex and difficult task. There is much more that could be said about what a
musical understanding must consist in. Though as we have done for musical morphemes, we can
avoid becoming overly concerned with particularities by simply relying on our shared intuitions
about what a musical understanding is. This shared intuition can be observed in how musical
experience is often characterized as fostering a strong sense of common meaning. We might feel
a strong sense of connection with others while listening to music in communal settings, or feel
that a piece of music has somehow expressed one’s own feelings. This intuition can be quite
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salient, and widely shared20, despite our not having an explanation of what our sense of musical
understanding consists in. This said, our goal in this section will be to establish approximate
knowledge of the musically invoked affective states of others. More specifically, our goal will be
to identify a theoretical justification for approximate knowledge that musical experiences among
individuals resemble each other, consequently justifying the intuition we often have that a
musical understanding has been achieved. I will argue that the Analogical Argument as it has
been presented thus far can indeed provide a basis for claims about the universal accessibility of
musical meaning, though demonstrating this will require further elaboration of the Analogical
Argument’s claims.
This investigation is imperative because music is a cultural universal and a common part
of everyday life for countless people. Considering this, having an ambiguous understanding of
the universal accessibility of musical meaning constitutes a significant gap in our understanding
of human experience at large. We should want to be able to confirm whether the apparent
correspondence in our musical experiences is justified or not. Thus, accounting for the universal
accessibility of musical meaning is a matter of philosophical importance.
In what is to follow, I argue that we can find theoretical justification for the intuitive
universal accessibility of musical meaning by relying primarily on the core principles of EMC.
In particular, the central role the mimetic hypothesis places on motor actions. To crudely restate
the core claim of EMC, the affective states we experience while listening to music are a kind of
‘fusion’, as it were, of the basic affective states we come to experience and know through motor
action. Thus, I will argue that we can have confidence that musical meaning is universally
accessible as follows: if musical affect is based in part on motor affect (via EMC), and we have
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This intuition may not necessarily be salient and widely shared for the same musical stimuli, but is salient and
widely shared with respect to different musical stimuli/experiences for different people.
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good reason to believe that there is a significant degree of universality for motor affect, then we
have good reason to believe that there is a significant degree of universality for musical affect
insofar as it is based on motor affect. Note that this argument contends only with the semantic
component of the Analogical Argument (EMC), though we should keep in mind the syntactic
component (GMG) as well.
The first premise in this argument (that musical affect is based on motor affect) has
already been defended on the basis of the mimetic hypothesis, and the conclusion follows
logically from the premises. Demonstrating the truth of this argument will then be a matter of
substantiating the second premise: the claim that there is a significant degree of universality for
motor affect.
We should now consider reasons for believing there is a significant degree of universality
for motor affect. Two reasons will be emphasized: the significant biological similarities among
humans, and the similarity in motor action conceptualization that the mimetic hypothesis
describes.
That there are significant biological similarities among humans is presumably
uncontroversial. We now know that 99.9% of genetics are shared among humans (Lander, E. S.
et al., 2001), for example, and many physiological similarities can be appreciated with the naked
eye. Though if these biological similarities are to support claims of similarities in motor affect,
the connection between biology and affective states must be drawn. I now defend the connection
between biological states and affective states.
The relationship between minds and bodies has long been a topic of philosophical
contention. While I acknowledge the importance of questions about whether and to what extent
the mind is essentially distinct from the body, I want to avoid getting involved in such debates

66

here. Rather, I’d like to highlight how, independent of what the fact of the matter is with regards
to mind/body distinctions, we can draw safe conclusions about the mind and/or body on the basis
of reliable relationships between nominally mental and physical phenomena. For example,
physical behaviors such as verbal or gestural expressions can all serve to indicate a mental state.
We find these behaviors to be reliably associated with certain affective states, and this allows
these behaviors to provide a basis for approximate knowledge of another's mental state.
Presumably even Dualists who believe the mind and body are distinct rely on such indicators to
navigate the world; and justifiably so, as these relationships are reliable.
Further, if we are inclined towards the belief that the mind is emergent from physical
phenomena, then we might be satisfied with a recognition of how, if we humans share 99.9% of
our DNA, it seems like we can generally expect that the processes that give rise to experiences
(neurology, physiology, etc.) are similar enough among people to realize similar mental states.
Establishing a connection between biological and mental states only helps us in
establishing a significant degree of universality of motor affect among humans if we think that
people in fact perform many of the same motor actions. I defend this assertion now.
Not unlike paradigm cases of mimesis, commonalities in performed motor actions are
especially apparent in infants. As infants, our earliest motor experiences are reflexive: we
consistently display the same set of basic and involuntary motor actions in response to certain
stimuli. These include reflexes such as sucking, which is observed when an object is inserted into
an infant’s mouth, or the Moro Reflex in which infants spread out their arms upon detecting a
loss in balance, among others (Modrell, A.K. & Tadi, Prasanna, 2021). Also, infants have been
observed to instinctively step as if they were walking when held upright with their feet touching
a surface (Yang, 1998), a motor action that might not seem so basic! The fact that such actions
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are observed in infants prior to their learning basic skills essential for navigating the world (e.g.
talking) lends credence to the idea that these actions are biologically innate.
If there is such a thing as innately prescribed motor actions, then we have principled
grounds on which to speculate that at least some basic motor actions, and their associated motor
affect, are universally known and experienced by humans. Though we may worry that, while
such empirically supported similarities in the motor action of infants are significant, they are not
sufficient for establishing similarities in performed motor actions at large; that is, motor actions
performed by non-infant humans.
As we get older and rely less on involuntary reflexes, our motor actions become more
diverse. To be sure, many motor reflexes such as recoiling your hand after touching a
dangerously hot object endure throughout our lives, and these secure at least some degree of
similarity in performed motor action. Though their prevalence is limited to relatively exceptional
circumstances, and our reliance on them is de-emphasized as we develop the capacities to
navigate the world and make decisions about which motor actions we want to perform. This is in
contrast to infants, who still lack such capacities, and therefore rely heavily on instinctive actions
for their survival. There is comparatively little diversity in the motor actions of infants, and much
of it can be summarized in terms of basic motor instincts.
In noticing this diversity of motor action among adults, we may even speculate that there
are some motor actions that are so rare as to only be experienced by very few individuals and/or
in very rare situations. Consequently, this would result in the motor affect associated with such
actions being scarcely experienced. For example, we might think that the affect associated with
walking on the moon simply bears no meaningful resemblance to the affect associated with
walking on Earth, because walking on the moon involves negotiating gravity in a totally different
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way. All motor experiences are distinct in at least some sense, but perhaps we think that the
affect associated with walking on the moon is distinct from the affect associated with more
standard motor experiences, such that this ‘distinctness’ is of a kind difference from the
‘distinctness’ that the affective states of standard motor experiences have with respect to each
other. If this is true, then it would seem to imply that the select few who have walked on the
moon, among other rare motor actions, would experience different musical affect from others by
way of EMC.
We can address this worry by appealing to core tenets of the mimetic hypothesis. Let us
recall Cox’s distinction between MMA (Mimetic Motor Action), which is concerned with overt
action, and MMI (Mimetic Motor Imagery), which is concerned with imagined motor action. In
Section 3, this distinction served to address a question similar to the one we face now: if musical
affect is based on the affect associated with producing a certain sound/playing a particular
instrument, why should we think someone who lacks knowledge of how to produce a certain
sound/play a particular instrument is able to associate the right affect to heard musical stimuli?
According to the mimetic hypothesis, we can bridge the gap between differential motor
experiences by appealing to our capacity to simulate the experience of performing novel motor
actions on the basis of our past motor experiences.
So while I might not know how to play the cello, I can get a pretty good sense of what it
must be like through MMI based on my knowledge of what it’s like to perform motor actions
that resemble the motor actions involved in playing the cello (e.g. swaying your arm about the
shoulder, pressing down on things with your fingers, etc.) or knowledge of what it’s like to
perform motor actions that cause sounds that resemble the sounds caused by a cello (e.g.
subvocalization).
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In principle, we should be able to imagine any motor action, musical and otherwise, we
have never performed, and imagine the affect that would be associated with it in exactly the same
way we imagine experiences of playing instruments we’ve never played. Indeed, playing an
instrument is just a particular kind of motor action, and there doesn’t seem to be a theoretical
basis for concluding that the principles explaining our conceptualization of novel musical motor
actions don’t apply to motor actions more generally.
We can now relate this back to the problem at hand. The capacity for MMI as just
described provides support for the notion that there is a significant degree of universality for
motor affect because our past motor experiences, which constrain MMI, are similar enough to
give way to similar MMI.
It is worth re-emphasizing here how remarkably similar our earliest motor experiences
are. If we all share these motor experiences, as well as experiences of instinctive action in
adulthood, then it seems as if when we utilize MMI, we are drawing on the same ‘affective
palette’, as it were. While we may ultimately perform different motor actions, the fact that we
share experiences of basic motor actions allows for our MMI to overlap significantly because
they are formed with the same general constraints.
Relatedly, we can question whether motor actions beyond infancy are really as diverse as
they might initially seem. While the motor actions of non-infant humans do not share the same
level of resemblance as the motor actions of infants, they will usually bear some significant level
of resemblance to basic motor actions such as jumping, outstretching your arms, stepping,
clenching your fist, etc.21 We can call such basic motor actions ‘motor archetypes’.

21

We might think this proposal can be alternatively defended on an Evolutionary basis: in the infinite range of
possible human movement, having heuristics for determining which of these infinite possible movements is
ultimately performed would be adaptive, and therefore selected for.
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To illustrate this point, we can again consider what might be the most rare motor actions
we know: Surely there is some especially unique affect associated with walking on the moon,
and I would have to walk on the moon myself to really know what this experience is like.
Though it seems as if I should be able to approximate the nature of this experience by relying on
past experiences of, say, trying to ‘walk’ underwater; through imagination, we can sometimes
use what we have previously experienced to achieve an understanding of what a novel
experience would be like with some significant degree of fidelity (Kind, 2020). I might not know
exactly what it’s like to negotiate gravity on the moon, but I know what it’s like to be in
situations resembling walking on the moon, like being underwater: while underwater, a great
deal of exertion is required to make small, slow movements and there is at least a feeling of
negotiating a weaker gravitational pull than is normal. Being able to rely on this experience, as
well as experiences of performing motor archetypes and possibly those of weightlessness while
in a descending elevator, it seems as if I should be able to approximate what it’s like to walk on
the moon with some degree of fidelity over and above a guess. Granted, there would
undoubtedly be many psychological factors influencing what the experience of walking on the
moon is like, but we only need to account for the motor affect as it is this that is most relevant to
EMC.
Even if it were the case that there is something about the experience of walking on the
moon that is truly unattainable through MMI, we can still think this would not have great
implications for musical affect because this act of walking on the moon would be one rare motor
experience among many. Even for the astronaut who has been to the moon several times, there is
good reason to believe that there would still be extensive similarity between their motor
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experiences and those of others (who have not been to the moon) such that there is still a
significant degree of correspondence between their musical affect and that of others.
If what has been said is true, and we have good reason to believe that there is a
significant degree of universality for motor affect, then we have good reason to believe there is a
significant degree of universality for musical affect insofar as it depends on motor affect, via
EMC. This argument goes a long way towards defending the universal accessibility of musical
meaning. Though let us remember that musical meaning, according to the Analogical Argument,
is determined not only by our basic affective responses to music (EMC), but also our structural
descriptions of it (GMG). Having explained why we should think our basic affective responses to
music are similar enough to subsist some level of universal musical meaning, we can now
consider how GMG might figure in this discussion. I will argue that the implications GMG has
for the universal accessibility of musical meaning are twofold: Firstly, the preference rules in
GMG that allow for different, but equally valid, musical structural descriptions constitute one
avenue by which musical meanings might vary among listeners. Secondly, GMG can help
explain why affective invocations diverge amone listeners with varying levels of exposure to
particular musical idioms, where ‘idiom’ refers to particular styles or genres of music (e.g. blues,
heavy metal, classical etc.); the answer involves how the process of generating structural
descriptions of music unfolds in real time, and explaining it will require further theoretical
resources. I will turn to this problem of divergent affective responses to particular musical idioms
after explaining the role preference rules play in the universal accessibility of musical meaning. I
turn to this explanation now.
Let us recall that, as the Analogical Argument states, the emergent musical meaning we
ultimately experience is determined by our basic affective responses to musical stimuli, but also
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how we relate these basic affective responses to each other—these relations are formalized in
musical structural descriptions. Let us also recall that, in contrast to linguistic structural
descriptions, Lerdahl and Jackendoff claim that musical structural descriptions involve
preference rules. This basically means that there can be different, but equally valid, musical
structural descriptions on the basis of preference/past musical experience.
Different relations among basic affective responses to music would necessarily entail
different emergent musical meanings via the Analogical Argument. However, we ought to keep
in mind that preference rules only allow for so much variance in the structural descriptions that
could be considered valid. Adherence to well-formedness rules is the primary constraint on what
could be considered a valid structural description, and these do not vary among individuals as
preference rules do. Insofar as varying applications of preference rules lead to varying structural
descriptions, agreement in the application of well-formedness rules ensures fundamentally
similar structural descriptions. This said, preference rules do not pose a significant threat to the
universal accessibility of musical meaning.
Thus, if we have principled reason to believe in the universal accessibility of musical
meaning on the basis of EMC as well as GMG, and these theories constitute the core components
of Analogical Argument (a theory of musical meaning), then we have principled reason to
believe in a universally accessible musical meaning.
With this, let us evaluate what has been established. What has been presented constitutes
an explanation of how we could justify the universal accessibility of musical meaning, in theory.
Though we often find this theoretical correspondence among musical experiences to not be
realized in practice; we can observe how verbal reports of the musical experiences of different
listeners sometimes do not correspond with each other, for example. In particular, this occurs
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when one listens to music from an idiom with which they are not familiar. Avid listeners of jazz
music may find great pleasure in a particular jazz performance, while the same music may sound
unpleasant to someone who has had little to no exposure to jazz.
The Analogical Argument as it has been presented thus far does not provide an
explanation for what goes wrong in such cases. It provides an explanation for how musical
understanding could be achieved in theory; the resemblance among the affective states invoked
in different listeners by the same piece of music should be a function of how much their motor
experiences resemble each other (EMC), as well as how much their preference rules resemble
each other (GMG). This remains true, though more theorizing will need to be done to explain
why we find cases of individuals with fairly similar motor experiences and preference rules, but
who have highly divergent affective responses to a given piece of music (as in the example of a
jazz performance given above). Call such cases, where we find listeners who should have the
same musical affective responses in theory, but don’t with respect to particular musical idioms,
cases of idiomatic divergence. I’d like to briefly propose a possible answer to this problem of
idiomatic divergence, though doing so will require some exposition of Huron’s ITPRA Theory
(Huron, 2006), a theory about expectation as a source of musical affect, and explaining how this
might interact with GMG and figure in the Analogical Argument’s theoretical framework more
broadly.
Before continuing, one might worry that if ITPRA Theory is needed to explain idiomatic
divergence, then the Analogical Argument is not a complete theory of musical meaning. Though
ITPRA Theory is merely an enhancement to the explanatory power of the Analogical Argument.
ITPRA Theory does not contradict any of the claims of the Analogical Argument, and is
compatible with the view that musical affect is basically the result of how structural descriptions
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organize elementary musical meaning so as to give way to emergent musical meaning. Though,
as has been mentioned before, Lerdahl and Jackendoff theorize about the generation of structural
descriptions of music from a time-independent perspective; they seek to explain only the
‘finished product’ of this process of generation. It goes without saying that the generation of
structural descriptions unfolds across time. Thus, there is room for theorization about how
affective responses to music might vary in real-time in relation to real-time generation of
structural descriptions. ITPRA Theory provides such theoretical resources, and incorporating it
increases the Analogical Argument’s explanatory scope by allowing it to explain idiomatic
divergence.
There are many philosophically interesting claims Huron makes in Sweet Anticipation:
Music and the Psychology of Expectation, a book where he presents his ITPRA theory.
Contending with all of them, as well as giving a comprehensive account of how the processes
Huron describes interact with EMC and GMG at a cognitive level, is beyond the scope of the
current project. I’d instead like to focus on the supporting role ITPRA Theory can play for the
Analogical Argument; this can be achieved by maintaining focus on a few core concepts from
Huron’s ITPRA Theory.
Briefly, the core proposal of Huron’s ITPRA22 Theory is the idea that the affect that is
invoked in musical experience is, in part, a result of certain predictive and evaluative proclivities
we have as humans. We have certain expectations, informed by statistical exposure, about what
impending events will be like (predictive), and make certain judgements or appraisals about the
events we’ve expected once they occur (evaluative). These predictive and evaluative processes
have affective components. To give some examples, we may feel tension or excitement prior to
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ITPRA stands for Imagination, Tension, Prediction, Reaction, Appraisal—these are the five response systems that
Huron takes to be responsible for expectation-related musical affect
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experiencing a particular event, or we may feel surprise or relief after having experienced an
expected event.
I’d like to focus on a theme in Huron’s account of the affective systematicity of ITPRA
processes that will be crucial for our purposes: this is the idea that the character of the affective
responses Huron describes are determined by the nature of our expectation. For example, in
anticipation, whether our expectation is positively or negatively valenced can be informed by
whether the thing we expect is a thing we desire to exist or occur. In evaluation, the character of
our affective responses could depend on how well our expectation accorded with the relevant
event. Huron theorizes that these expectational and evaluative proclivities are, in part,
responsible for the affective states we experience in musical experience. Finally, not unlike Cox’s
claims about EMC, Huron takes ITPRA processes to be automatic and rooted in our
physiology—roughly, Huron’s claim is that expectations involve changes in our action readiness
or behavioral proclivities. This has implications for our bodily states, which then has
implications for affect (per the previous discussion on the connection between bodily states and
affective states).
We can now begin integrating these concepts into the Analogical Argument. I argue that
our musical expectations are primarily guided by our real-time structural description of music, a
claim that will go against Huron’s own view that our musical expectations are guided primarily
by statistical exposure to certain sequences of sounds. To be clear, this is not to say that statistical
exposure plays no role in our musical expectations. My claim is that the nature of our musical
expectations can not just be a matter of the sounds and sound sequences we have had prior
exposure to; our musical expectations are first constrained by certain rules of ‘musical grammar’,
and the effects of statistical exposure on our expectations follow this. To briefly explain this
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disagreement, I take this position because proposing that statistical exposure exclusively guides
our musical expectations leaves the question of why musical sounds/sound sequences have
greater affective implications than other non-musical sounds/sound sequences for which we have
had similar statistical exposure. Why don’t we have vivid and salient affective states when
hearing the sounds of clock tower bells, the sounds of household appliances like microwaves and
washing machines, etc.? Further, if statistical exposure was all that was responsible for how we
formed our musical expectations, why would it be the case that we often observe infants (who
have presumably had much less exposure to music) reacting to music in ways that indicate
similar affective responses as adults?
As has hopefully been demonstrated, the Analogical Argument can address such
concerns. It does so, in part, by appealing to the process of structural description generation.
Further, recall the discussion in Section 6 on the relational nature of musical meaning. Here, we
had already identified an explanation of how structural description can guide our musical
expectations: while generating structural descriptions, we notice certain patterns and regularities,
and this predisposes us to expect these patterns and regularities to be completed or continued, or
not. For these reasons, I propose that structural features of music, and not our statistical exposure
to certain sounds, better serve as guides to our musical predictions.
Let us now return to the problem of idiomatic divergence. Musical idioms, again, are
particular styles or genres of music. Though we can alternatively define musical idioms as sets of
tendencies towards certain musical patterns and regularities. Jazz, for example, can be very
loosely characterized as a style of music in which musical patterns and regularities such as ii-V-I
chordal cadences and ‘swung’ rhythms, are prominent. This is not to say that if a particular piece
of music does not include a ii-V-I cadence that it cannot belong to the Jazz idiom. Jazz merely
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has a tendency towards this particular structural pattern such that this tendency is characteristic
of it. We say that a piece belongs to a musical idiom x when it conforms to the patterns and
regularities that x has a tendency towards to some significant extent.
When we are familiar with a particular musical idiom, we are familiar with the structural
patterns and regularities that are characteristic of it, and this knowledge can give way to accurate
predictions about which patterns and regularities will be continued or not in a piece of music,
and how this will happen. While listening to a jazz performance, if I hear a ii-V chordal cadence,
and I know that the ii-V-I is a chordal cadence that is characteristic of Jazz on the basis of
statistical exposure, then I can form the justified expectation that the ii-V cadence will continue
to a ii-V-I cadence.
Contrast this with instances in which one is exposed to music from an idiom with which
they are not familiar. In these cases, the listener does not have the knowledge that would be
required to make justified predictions about how musical structural patterns and regularities will
be continued or not. Consequently, a great deal of their predictions would just be incorrect.
To be sure, listeners often make incorrect predictions about music that belongs to an
idiom with which they are familiar. To a certain extent, this should be desired, as Huron
highlights the importance of surprise (caused by incorrect predictions) as a source of positively
valenced musical affect. When listening to music from an idiom x, a listener who is familiar with
x is more likely to have a pleasurable experience because, in addition to making some incorrect
predictions about structural patterns and regularities, they will also make correct predictions.
Again, this is in contrast to listeners who have not had exposure to x and are therefore more
likely to make incorrect predictions than correct ones.
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We can appreciate how this balance between correct and incorrect predictions is critical
for pleasurable musical experiences when we consider Huron’s concept of contrastive valence
(Huron, 2006). Basically, this is the idea that the valence of a particular affective state is
dependent on the character or valence of the affective states that precede it. For example, there is
positively valenced affect associated with drinking a cool glass of water. Though this affect is
especially positively valenced if we’ve spent a good deal of time outside on a scorching hot day.
The contrast that the positively valenced affect of drinking a cool glass of water has with the
negatively valenced affect of being outside too long on a scorching hot day serves to highlight
and amplify the positive valence of drinking the cool glass of water. This is contrastive valence.
Huron takes contrastive valence to play a role in musical experience in essentially the
same way it has just been explained. When listening to music, we have certain expectations
about what will happen next. These expectations have physiological implications by way of
priming action readiness or behavioral proclivities, and these physiological implications entail
affective implications. When our musical predictions are inaccurate, there is a contrast between
the affect that is associated with this, and the affect that is associated with accurate predictions
we have made. Thus, having what would typically be considered a pleasurable musical
experience involves a balance between accurate and inaccurate musical predictions. Further, this
is why idiomatic divergence occurs. The listener that has had prior exposure to Jazz can have a
pleasurable listening experience when listening to Jazz because they are able to make enough
correct predictions about the music to achieve contrastive valence.
If this is true, we might be left wondering why, when we listen to highly predictable
music (e.g. our favorite song), we don’t always have unpleasurable musical experiences. In
theory, it seems like such cases should be unpleasurable for the same reason listening to music
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that is highly unpredictable would be unpleasant—namely, there is no contrast between accurate
and inaccurate predictions, and therefore no contrastive valence. As Nussbuam points out, the
potential for music to invoke affective states even when we know what will happen in the music
can be explained by appealing to the role of MMI (Nussbaum, 2007).23 Even when we hear a
piece of music for which we have already generated a structural description, we still
imaginatively perform the actions that we associate with musical sounds; put another way,
musical experience is something we do, as opposed to passively observe.24 This is not unlike
how, when recalling a memory involving the performance of motor actions (e.g. a memory of
swimming underwater), we feel some of the affect we originally experienced in virtue of our
mentally simulating past events.

23

Nussbaum appeals to mental simulation, and not MMI explicitly, though the mental simulation Nussbau has in
mind is essentially what Cox describes when he defines MMI.
24
This doesn’t exactly translate to musical experiences with too many incorrect predictions, because these incorrect
predictions entail a disordered real-time generation of a musical structural description. Per the Analogical Argument,
this would mean a disordered real-time relation among basic motor affective states, but also the motor imagery that
coincides with them. Having disordered relations among our motor imagery is tantamount to not being able to have
the continuous motor simulation (not being able to ‘do’ music) that the other kinds of musical experiences in
question (those with no contrastive valence as a result of correct prediction) have, and which secure ensure
pleasurable musical experiences.
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Section 8: Next Steps
In this thesis, I have proposed a theory of musical meaning, as well as a theory of how
how and why musical meaning might vary among listeners. While I take to these theories to
provide substantive contributions to philosophical and scientific investigations of music, it must
be admitted that they are coarse theories, as it were. They explain musical phenomena at an
abstract level, and a great deal more work would need to be done to achieve a comprehensive
account of how we go from particular musical stimuli to particular affective states, if such a
thing is even possible. We should be clear about what is still left to explain. These remaining
questions can be roughly divided into those that involve clarifying the processes and capacities
already considered in this thesis, and those that involve processes and capacities not considered
in this thesis. I provide a brief overview of these questions here.
Firstly, as discussed in Section 4, both EMC and GMG fall short of explaining the role of
harmony in musical meaning. By extension, the unified theory presented here also fails to
explain the role of harmony in musical meaning, and this is problematic because harmony is
involved in the vast majority of musical pieces.
Throughout this thesis, I have appealed to innate capacities playing a role in musical
experience. Though there remains much room to clarify the precise extent to which such musical
capacities are innate or not. Also, there is more left to learn about the neural and cognitive
cognitive bases of these capacities; these investigations may lend support to the Analogical
Argument or not. There has been some evidence indicating a neural correspondence between
music and language processing; for example, Broca’s area and the pars orbitalis region, both
being brain areas associated with language processing, can be observed to be activated when
listening to music (Tan et al., 2010). Additionally, suffering lesions to brain areas associated with
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music processing have been observed to have implications for language processing, such as not
being able to discriminate between statements and questions (e.g. ‘That’s a tiger’ or ‘That’s a
tiger?’) which differ as a result of pitch alteration (Tan et al., 2010). This said, there is also
evidence indicating some neural independence of language- and music-processing.
We don’t yet know what role attention plays in this process. We know that music
generally invokes affective states. Though this is apparently contradicted by our not having
salient affective states when, for example, a piece of music is playing quietly and we are too
engrossed in a conversation to engage with it. We may be able to register the musical stimuli we
receive, yet not have strong reactions to them such that we have a musical experience, but don’t
construe musical meaning (Section 2). This suggests our attending to the music plays a role in
whether we perceive it as meaningful, but the mechanics of this process (e.g. How much
attention is required? Does it matter which aspects of the music we pay particular attention to?)
remain unknown.
Beyond such matters, we can inquire into the roles that high-level psychological states
such as beliefs, attitudes, and desires play in musical experience25. What about musical meaning
changes, if anything, when I believe the composition I’m listening to is about love, World War I,
tigers, etc.? Also, intra-individual variations in musical experience provoke questions of the role
that moods might play in our musical preferences. It is often unclear exactly how our moods
affect our listening preferences (why do we choose the actual song/genre that we do?) though we
can recognize a change in our preferences clearly enough for us to know that they are playing a
role. Similarly, why do some people simply like or enjoy music more than others? We sometimes
develop new tastes in music fairly spontaneously (that is, not as a result of differentiated

25

This question is more germane to lyrical or program music, which does have an object, and which was not
considered in this thesis.
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statistical exposure or from a radical change in moods), and this is also mysterious. There also
remain questions of how musical experience might vary based on the social context in which it is
had. How does musical experience vary according to the gender, socioeconomic status, race, etc.
of the listener?
Finally, we should look towards ways of bridging explanations of musical experience
with aesthetics. It’s clear that, aside from feelings, we sometimes find beauty in musical
experience, and we can sometimes appreciate aesthetic value in music we don’t necessarily
enjoy. There does seem to be an intimate relationship between the musically invoked affective
states that are explained by the Analogical Argument and perceptions of beauty, though the
complex nature of this relationship has yet to be elucidated. We should strive towards moving
beyond investigations of music as a mere conceptual and scientific artifact, and strive towards
investigating music as an art form that can only be truly known through experience, and which
has the power to add meaning to our lives.
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